Gilles Grolleau (Montpellier SupAgro and Researcher at LAMETA), Murat C. Mungan (George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty), and Naoefel Mzoughi (INRA Ecodéveloppement) have published "Punishment Menus and Their Deterrent Effects: An Exploratory Analysis" on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Conventional wisdom suggests that allowing offenders to choose alternative sanctions to a previously existing punishment cannot enhance deterrence, because offenders can simply select the least costly option available. We experimentally test whether people may perceive punishment menus as more deterrent than stand-alone sanctions available within the same menu. Our results suggest that this is possible, and that changes in people’s perceptions are often mediated by the mindset (e.g., calculative, ethical) they adopt to evaluate punishment schemes as well as their impressions of the seriousness of the illegal act.
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