Brian Flanagan (National University of Ireland - Faculty of Law), Guilherme F. C. F. De Almeida (Yale University), Noel Struchiner (Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro), and Ivar Hannikainen (University of Sheffield - Department of Philosophy) have published "Moral Appraisals Guide Intuitive Legal Determinations" on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Socialization demands the capacity to observe a plethora of private, legal, and institutional rules. To accomplish this, individuals must grasp rules’ meaning and infer the class of conduct each proscribes. Yet this basic account neglects important nuance in the way we reason about complex cases in which a rule’s literal or textualist interpretation conflicts with deeper values. In six studies (total N = 2541), we examined legal determinations through the lens of these cases. We found that moral appraisals—of both the rule’s value (Study 1) and the agent’s character (Studies 2-3)—shaped people’s application of rules, driving counter-literal legal determinations. These effects were stronger under time pressure and were weakened by the opportunity to reflect (Study 4). Our final studies explored the role of theory of mind: Textualist judgments arose when agents were described as cognizant of the rule’s text yet ignorant of its deeper purpose (Study 5). Meanwhile, the intuitive tendency toward counter-literal determinations was strongest when the rule’s purpose could be inferred from its text—pointing toward an influence of spontaneous mental state ascriptions (Studies 6a-6b). Together, our results elucidate the cognitive basis of legal reasoning: Intuitive legal determinations build on core competencies in moral cognition, including mental state and character inferences. In turn, cognitive control dampens these effects, promoting a broadly textualist response pattern.
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