Neuroethics & Law Blog

"The Present and Near Future of Self-Driving Contracts" by Casey & Niblett

Anthony J. Casey (University of Chicago Law School, ECGI) and Anthony Niblett (University of Toronto - Faculty of Law, Vector Institute for Artificial Intelligence) have published "The Present and Near Future of Self-Driving Contracts" on SSRN. Here is the abstract: 

There has been a tidal wave of research in recent years examining the potential effects of artificial intelligence on the law. As early predictions from that literature begin to play out, small changes in the legal landscape are taking shape. This provides an opportune moment to take stock. In this chapter, we explore how AI is impacting automated private contracts today and in the near future.

We revisit the idea of ‘self-driving contracts.’ The self-driving contract consists of data-driven predictive algorithms, specified up front, that give the parties context-specific directives on how to comply with a contract’s objective. Rather than relying on human referees to fill gaps and reform provisions after disputes arise, these contracts would rely on micro-directives—which gather data about the current state of the world and account for the purpose of the contract—to update the parties’ obligations at the time of performance.

While the fully-specified self-driving contract may seem distant, this chapter discusses how AI technology is already being used to automate the building blocks of such contracts: self-driving provisions. We explore four examples of AI technology in this context: (1) dynamic pricing to automate the price of performance; (2) litigation analytics to automate the terms of non-performance; (3) legal review technology to automate legal compliance; and (4) negotiation technology to automate substantive obligations. The implications, lessons, and challenges presented by these technological developments are discussed.

"Philosophy of Contract Law" by Markovits & Atiq

Daniel Markovits (Yale Law School) and Emad H. Atiq (Cornell University - Law School, Cornell University - Sage School of Philosophy) have published "Philosophy of Contract Law" on SSRN. Here is the abstract: 

The law of contracts, at least in its orthodox expression, concerns voluntary, or chosen, legal obligations. When Brody accepts Susan’s offer to sell him a canoe for a set price, the parties’ choices alter their legal rights and duties. Their success at changing the legal landscape depends on a background system of rules that specify when and how contractual acts have legal effects, rules that give the offer and acceptance of a bargain-exchange a central role in generating obligations. Contract law conceived as a body of rules empowering individuals to shape their own rights and responsibilities presents an object of philosophical study. The philosophy of contract includes two broad sets of projects. One set, the focus of the first part of this entry, targets the basic structure and normative justification of the law of contracts. The aim is to subsume a salient body of contract law rules under general principles in order to clarify contract law’s conceptual categories, distinguish it from other areas of law, and specify criteria relevant to its normative appraisal. This kind of philosophical work presupposes detailed knowledge of the law in existing legal regimes, and the entry begins by outlining the common law of contracts. A second set of projects draws on resources from the philosophy of language, philosophy of action, and moral and political philosophy to address debates within contract law. Questions about the nature of meaning and interpretation, intentionality, freedom in contract, and distributive justice drive contemporary legal debates concerning contract formation, interpretation, and enforcement. Philosophical work on these topics has attracted significant commentary which serves as the focus of the second part of this entry.

"Legal Simplification And AI" by Eliot

Dr. Lance B. Eliot (Stanford Center for Legal Informatics) has published "Legal Simplification And AI" on SSRN. Here is the abstract: 

Many advocates are urging that our existing laws are overly complex and need to be simplified. Interestingly, the advent of AI in the law can readily enter into this same discourse. It might be easier to intertwine AI and the law if the law was simplified, and/or the act of intertwining AI with the law could spur the simplification of the law. Tradeoffs though must be considered.

"Moral Appraisals Guide Intuitive Legal Determinations" by Flanagan et al

Brian Flanagan (National University of Ireland - Faculty of Law), Guilherme F. C. F. De Almeida (Yale University), Noel Struchiner (Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro), and Ivar Hannikainen (University of Sheffield - Department of Philosophy) have published "Moral Appraisals Guide Intuitive Legal Determinations" on SSRN. Here is the abstract: 

Socialization demands the capacity to observe a plethora of private, legal, and institutional rules. To accomplish this, individuals must grasp rules’ meaning and infer the class of conduct each proscribes. Yet this basic account neglects important nuance in the way we reason about complex cases in which a rule’s literal or textualist interpretation conflicts with deeper values. In six studies (total N = 2541), we examined legal determinations through the lens of these cases. We found that moral appraisals—of both the rule’s value (Study 1) and the agent’s character (Studies 2-3)—shaped people’s application of rules, driving counter-literal legal determinations. These effects were stronger under time pressure and were weakened by the opportunity to reflect (Study 4). Our final studies explored the role of theory of mind: Textualist judgments arose when agents were described as cognizant of the rule’s text yet ignorant of its deeper purpose (Study 5). Meanwhile, the intuitive tendency toward counter-literal determinations was strongest when the rule’s purpose could be inferred from its text—pointing toward an influence of spontaneous mental state ascriptions (Studies 6a-6b). Together, our results elucidate the cognitive basis of legal reasoning: Intuitive legal determinations build on core competencies in moral cognition, including mental state and character inferences. In turn, cognitive control dampens these effects, promoting a broadly textualist response pattern.