Neuroethics & Law Blog

"The Role of Emotion Regulation in Moral Judgment" by Helion, and Ochsner

"The Role of Emotion Regulation in Moral Judgment" by Chelsea Helion, and Kevin N. Ochsner has been published in the most recent issue of Neuroethics.

Moral judgment has typically been characterized as a conflict between emotion and reason. In recent years, a central concern has been determining which process is the chief contributor to moral behavior. While classic moral theorists claimed that moral evaluations stem from consciously controlled cognitive processes, recent research indicates that affective processes may be driving moral behavior. Here, we propose a new way of thinking about emotion within the context of moral judgment, one in which affect is generated and transformed by both automatic and controlled processes, and moral evaluations are shifted accordingly. We begin with a review of how existing theories in psychology and neuroscience address the interaction between emotion and cognition, and how these theories may inform the study of moral judgment. We then describe how brain regions involved in both affective processing and moral judgment overlap and may make distinct contributions to the moral evaluation process. Finally, we discuss how this way of thinking about emotion can be reconciled with current theories in moral psychology before mapping out future directions in the study of moral behavior.

"Understanding Self-Control as a Whole vs. Part Dynamic" by Fujita, Carnevale, and Trope

"Understanding Self-Control as a Whole vs. Part Dynamic" by Kentaro Fujita, Jessica J. Carnevale, and Yaacov Trope has been published in the most recent issue of Neuroethics.

Although dual-process or divided-mind models of self-control dominate the literature, they suffer from empirical and conceptual challenges. We propose an alternative approach, suggesting that self-control can be characterized by a fragmented part versus integrated whole dynamic. Whereas responses to events derived from fragmented parts of the mind undermine self-control, responses to events derived from integrated wholes enhance self-control. We review empirical evidence from psychology and related disciplines that support this model. We, moreover, discuss the implications of this work for psychology, neuroscience, economics, and philosophy. In particular, we highlight how this model addresses many of the conceptual and empirical short-comings of divided-mind models. We suggest that understanding self-control as the interplay between fragmented parts versus integrated wholes, moreover, provides novel insights and testable new hypotheses.

"Updating our Selves: Synthesizing Philosophical and Neurobiological Perspectives on Incorporating New Information into our Worldview" by Niker, Reiner, and Felsen

"Updating our Selves: Synthesizing Philosophical and Neurobiological Perspectives on Incorporating New Information into our Worldview" by Fay Niker, Peter B. Reiner, and Gidon Felsen has been published in the most recent issue of Neuroethics.

Given the ubiquity and centrality of social and relational influences to the human experience, our conception of self-governance must adequately account for these external influences. The inclusion of socio-historical, externalist (i.e., “relational”) considerations into more traditional internalist (i.e., “individualist”) accounts of autonomy has been an important feature of the debate over personal autonomy in recent years. But the relevant socio-temporal dynamics of autonomy are not only historical in nature. There are also important, and under-examined, future-oriented questions about how we retain autonomy while incorporating new values into the existing set that guides our interaction with the world. In this paper, we examine these questions from two complementary perspectives: philosophy and neuroscience. After contextualizing the philosophical debate, we show the importance to theories of autonomous agency of the capacity to appropriately adapt our values and beliefs, in light of relevant experiences and evidence, to changing circumstances. We present a plausible philosophical account of this process, which we claim is generally applicable to theories about the nature of autonomy, both internalist and externalist alike. We then evaluate this account by providing a model for how the incorporation of values might occur in the brain; one that is inspired by recent theoretical and empirical advances in our understanding of the neural processes by which our beliefs are updated by new information. Finally, we synthesize these two perspectives and discuss how the neurobiology might inform the philosophical discussion.

Information Processing Biases in the Brain: Implications for Decision-Making and Self-Governance by Sali, Anderson, and Courtney

Information Processing Biases in the Brain: Implications for Decision-Making and Self-Governance by Anthony W. Sali, Brain A. Anderson, and Susan M. Courtney has been published in the most recent issue of Neuroethics.

To make behavioral choices that are in line with our goals and our moral beliefs, we need to gather and consider information about our current situation. Most information present in our environment is not relevant to the choices we need or would want to make and thus could interfere with our ability to behave in ways that reflect our underlying values. Certain sources of information could even lead us to make choices we later regret, and thus it would be beneficial to be able to ignore that information. Our ability to exert successful self-governance depends on our ability to attend to sources of information that we deem important to our decision-making processes. We generally assume that, at any moment, we have the ability to choose what we pay attention to. However, recent research indicates that what we pay attention to is influenced by our prior experiences, including reward history and past successes and failures, even when we are not aware of this history. Even momentary distractions can cause us to miss or discount information that should have a greater influence on our decisions given our values. Such biases in attention thus raise questions about the degree to which the choices that we make may be poorly informed and not truly reflect our ability to otherwise exert self-governance.

"Decision-Making and Self-Governing Systems" by Roskies

Decision-Making and Self-Governing Systems by Adina L. Roskies has been published in the most recent issue of Neuroethics:

Neuroscience has illuminated the neural basis of decision-making, providing evidence that supports specific models of decision-processes. These models typically are quite mechanical, the realization of abstract mathematical “diffusion to bound” models. While effective decision-making seems to be essential for sophisticated behavior, central to an account of freedom, and a necessary characteristic of self-governing systems, it is not clear how the simple models neuroscience inspires can underlie the notion of self-governance. Drawing from both philosophy and neuroscience I explore ways in which the proposed decision-making architectures can play a role in systems that can reasonably be thought of as “self-governing”.

"Free Will, Self-Governance and Neuroscience: An Overview" by Carse, Bok, and Mathews

Free Will, Self-Governance and Neuroscience: An Overview by Alisa Carse, Hilary Bok, and Debra JH Mathews has been published in the most recent issue of Neuroethics:

 Given dramatic increases in recent decades in the pace of scientific discovery and understanding of the functional organization of the brain, it is increasingly clear that engagement with the neuroscientific literature and research is central to making progress on philosophical questions regarding the nature and scope of human freedom and responsibility. While patterns of brain activity cannot provide the whole story, developing a deeper and more precise understanding of how brain activity is related to human choice and conduct is crucial to the development of realistic, just, and intellectually rigorous models of human agency and moral responsibility. In this special issue, we acknowledge that “free will” and “moral responsibility” are not concepts with which neuroscience can directly engage, and instead focus on self-governance, and the capacities that contribute to self-governance, which are more tractable for scientific investigation and are prerequisites for the presence of moral responsibility.

 

"A General Mitigation for Crimes Driven by Emotion?: Physiological, Personal Choice, and Normative Inquiries" by Robinson

Paul H. Robinson (University of Pennsylvania Law School) has posted "A General Mitigation for Crimes Driven by Emotion?: Physiological, Personal Choice, and Normative Inquiries" on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

It is argued here that the narrow provoked “heat of passion” mitigation available under current law ought to be significantly expanded to include not just murder but all felonies and not just “heat of passion” but potentially all emotions. The mitigation would be limited, however, to those instances in which the jury finds that a mitigation is deserved upon taking account of the extent of the internal pressure to commit the offense (the physiological inquiry), the extent of the offender’s efforts to resist that pressure (the personal choice inquiry), and the effect of giving such a mitigation on community values (the normative inquiry). The codified general mitigation provision is proposed. It would be applied by juries but would not from preempt any mitigation that a judge could otherwise lawfully give.

Recognition of such a general mitigation would play a fundamental role in building the criminal law’s moral credibility with the community it governs. Whether it is given by a trial jury or instead influences plea negotiations that track predictions about what would happen at trial, it can give the community some greater confidence that the criminal justice system is seriously committed to setting deserved punishment in strict proportion to an offender’s blameworthiness. And, as I have argued elsewhere, such increased moral credibility can significantly increase the system’s crime-control effectiveness.