Neuroethics & Law Blog

PEBS Neuroethics Roundup (JHU)

Noninvasive Deep Brain Stimulation – Has Neuroscience’s Holy Grail Been Found? Discovery: Neuroskeptic   Beyond the Five Senses, The Atlantic Studies reveal that secrets are bad for your health—even after you tell them, Quartz Do happy faces or sad faces raise more money? The Conversation Fake News – A Role for Neuroethics? The Neuroethics Blog Is it unethical to design robots to resemble humans? Quartz What Do “Emotion” and “Mood” Actually Mean? Scientific American New Model of Evolution Finally Reveals How Cooperation Evolves, MIT Technology Review Is it Possible to Stimulate Deep Inside Our Brains Without Implanting Hardware? Gizmodo A Neural Network Turned a Book of Flowers Into Shockingly Lovely Dinosaur Art, SPLOID High Chair Philosophers, Scientific American Inside the Mind of a Hypocrite, The Atlantic Beautiful Brain: The Stunning Drawings of Neuroscience Founding Father Santiago Ramón y Cajal, Brainpickings Quick-Thinking AI Camera Mimics the Human Brain, Scientific American   The sleep-deprived human brain, Nature Reviews Neuroscience Functional near-infrared spectroscopy assessment of reward perception based on visual self-expression: Coloring, doodling, and free drawing, The Arts in Psychotherapy The happiness paradox: your friends are happier than you, EPJ Data Science Valnoctamide inhibits cytomegalovirus infection in developing brain and attenuates neurobehavioral dysfunctions and brain abnormalities, Journal of Neuroscience

Subscribe to our mailing list The Program in Ethics and Brain Sciences (PEBS) is a collaborative effort of the Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics and the Johns Hopkins Brain Sciences Institute . The goal of PEBS is to ensure that research in brain science proceeds with an informed understanding of ethical issues, and that philosophical and empirical analyses of the advances in brain research proceed with an informed understanding of the science.

 

2017 Neuroscience & Society Meeting- Call for Abstracts

 

 

**CALL FOR ABSTRACTS** Deadline: 7 July 2017

 

NEUROSCIENCE & SOCIETY: ETHICAL, LEGAL & CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS OF NEUROSCIENCE RESEARCH

14-15 September 2017

Sydney, NSW, Australia

 

Researchers, practitioners, clinicians and other professionals from Australia and internationally are invited to submit abstracts for presentation at the 2017 Neuroscience & Society Meeting in Sydney, Australia. The meeting will feature a wide range of exciting scientific lectures and ethical, philosophical and legal discussions, with numerous networking opportunities with experts, researchers, and emerging leaders in the field of neuroethics and neurolaw.

 

Abstracts are invited from those working in the fields of ethics, law, neuroscience, mathematics and engineering, psychology and psychiatry, philosophy, allied health care, and public policy. Abstracts of an empirical, legal, and philosophical nature related to the field of neuroethics are welcomed. Investigators at all career stages are encouraged to submit one or more abstracts.

 

Abstracts will be peer reviewed and acceptance will be based on content, available space, and overall program balance. A small number of selected abstracts will be invited for an oral presentation. Other selected abstracts will be invited for a poster presentation.

 

Presentations are welcomed on any neuroethics topic, although particular consideration will be given to those addressing the key conference themes of:

•    Ageing and dementia

•    The developing brain

•    Disability and mental health

•    Disorders of self control

•    Moral cognition and moral technologies, and

•    Artificial intelligence and machine learning

•    Neurolaw

Selected papers will be invited to be submitted to a special issue of the journal Neuroethics. All papers will undergo peer review - an invitation will not guarantee publication.

 

For more information, please visit: http://neuroethicsconference.org.au

Enquiries may be emailed to adrian.carter@monash.edu.au or jeanette.kennett@mq.edu.au

 

Submitting an Abstract

 

Abstracts are due by 7 July and are to be submitted via email to adrian.carter@monash.edu

 

All submissions must include:

•    A clear and concise abstract of no more than 300 words

•    A title (formatted in Title Case, not UPPERCASE)

•    A list of all authors using their preferred abbreviations, as well as each author’s full name ("J. Doe[1,2], M. Bach[1,3]" along with "Jonathan Doe" and "Michelle Bach," for example)

•    Institution affiliations for each author

•    References (up to five) using the Neuroethics journal format

•    Disclosure of any conflicts of interest

Work presented in abstracts must be in compliance with local policies, ethical review related to the use of humans and animals in research, and the disclosure and conflict of interest statement listed below.

 

Abstracts will be  reviewed by conference organising committee and selected abstracts for oral and poster presentations will be notified by July 14.

 

Neuroscience & Society is supported by the ARC Centre of Excellence for Integrative Brain Function Neuroethics Program, the Centre for Agency, Values, and Ethics at Macquarie University, and the Brain and Mind Centre at the University of Sydney.

 

Conference organisers:

•    Jeanette Kennett (Macquarie University)

•    Adrian Carter (Monash University)

•    Sascha Callaghan (University of Sydney)

•    Cynthia Forlini (University of Sydney)

•    Neil Levy (Macquarie University and University of Oxford)

•    Nicole Vincent (Macquarie University)

•    Allan McCay (University of Sydney)

 

PEBS Neuroethics Roundup (JHU)

Older Kids Are More Likely to Confess to Bad Deeds, Scientific American   How the brain stores traumatic images and triggers flashbacks, The Guardian Scientists are finding more genes linked to IQ. This doesn’t mean we can predict intelligence. Vox Illusions influence our predictions about how well we’ll remember in the future, The Conversation  Faces recreated from monkey brain signals, BBC  The Secret to My Success? Antidepressants, The New York Times Opinion  Draper's Genetically Modified Cyborg DragonflEye Takes Flight, IEEE Spectrum  Photo: Draper We Need to Talk About the Power of AI to Manipulate Humans, MIT Technology Review  What Can Comedians Teach Us about Imagination? Scientific American   Cracking The Code That Lets The Brain ID Any Face, Fast, NPR: Shots  NIH scientists try to crack the brain’s memory codes, NIH News An interview with Prof Judy Illes, President of the International Neuroethics Society, Federation of European Neuroscience Societies  Working memory: How you keep things ‘in mind’ over the short term, The Conversation  The psychological reason you love watching online videos that gross you out, Quartz Robots will be more useful if they are made to lack confidence, New Scientist  Scientists improve people's creativity through electrical brain stimulation, Science Daily  Brain Scans May Forecast Autism in Babies, Scientific American  Opioid receptors in brain affect reaction to another person’s pain, SCOPE Blog  The psychological benefits – and trappings – of nostalgia, The Conversation   The cart before the horse: When cognitive neuroscience precedes cognitive neuropsychology, Cognitive Neuropsychology How the brain codes intimacy: The neurobiological substrates of romantic touch, Human Brain Mapping  Active Listening Delays Attentional Disengagement and Saccadic Eye Movements, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review  Human Cortical Neurons in the Anterior Temporal Lobe Reinstate Spiking Activity during Verbal Memory Retrieval, Current Biology  Cued Memory Retrieval Exhibits Reinstatement of High Gamma Power on a Faster Timescale in the Left Temporal Lobe and Prefrontal Cortex, Journal of Neuroscience  Temperature variability is integrated by a spatially embedded decision-making center to break dormancy in Arabidopsis seeds, PNAS  Episodic Tags Enhance Striatal Valuation Signals during Temporal Discounting in Pathological Gamblers, eNeuro

Subscribe to our mailing list The Program in Ethics and Brain Sciences (PEBS) is a collaborative effort of the Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics and the Johns Hopkins Brain Sciences Institute . The goal of PEBS is to ensure that research in brain science proceeds with an informed understanding of ethical issues, and that philosophical and empirical analyses of the advances in brain research proceed with an informed understanding of the science.

 

PEBS Neuroethics Roundup (JHU)

The brain starts to eat itself after chronic sleep deprivation, New Scientist   My déjà vu is so extreme I can’t tell what’s real any more, Mosaic Science Electric Brain Stimulation Offers Binge-Eating Clue, Scientific American How Data Mining Facebook Messages Can Reveal Substance Abusers, MIT Technology Review How our brains integrate online reviews into our own product preferences, Science Daily The Earliest Signs of Brain Damage in Athletes? Listen for Them, The New York Times Older Kids Are More Likely to Confess to Bad Deeds, Scientific American Take a look, and you'll see, into your imagination, Science Daily General-Purpose Brain-Computer Interface Brings Thought Control to Any PC, MIT Technology Review Gender Bias in the Sciences: A Neuroethical Priority, The Neuroethics Blog  Homing In on the Brain's "Cuddling" Circuitry, Scientific American How Have I Lived My Whole Life Without an Extra Pair of Robot Arms? Gizmodo 'Like Brain Boot Camp': Using Music To Ease Hearing Loss, NPR: Shots Brain switch in voles makes them fall in love at first sight, New Scientist    Neuroplasticity in learning to read, Science Rapid binge-like eating and body weight gain driven by zona incerta GABA neuron activation, Science Child gender influences paternal behavior, language, and brain function, Behavioral Neuroscience Contralesional Brain–Computer Interface Control of a Powered Exoskeleton for Motor Recovery in Chronic Stroke Survivors, Stroke Detectable Neuropsychological Differences in Early Preclinical Alzheimer’s Disease: A Meta-Analysis, Neuropsychology Review

Subscribe to our mailing list The Program in Ethics and Brain Sciences (PEBS) is a collaborative effort of the Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics and the Johns Hopkins Brain Sciences Institute . The goal of PEBS is to ensure that research in brain science proceeds with an informed understanding of ethical issues, and that philosophical and empirical analyses of the advances in brain research proceed with an informed understanding of the science.

 

"How Should Justice Policy Treat Young Offenders?"

Recently posted on SSRN: "How Should Justice Policy Treat Young Offenders?" 

BJ CASEY, Yale University - Department of Psychology

RICHARD J. BONNIE, University of Virginia - School of Law

ANDRE DAVIS, US Court of Appeals - Fourth Circuit

DAVID L. FAIGMAN, University of California Hastings College of the Law

MORRIS B. HOFFMAN, Second Judicial District Court Judge, State of Colorado

OWEN D. JONES, Vanderbilt University - Law School & Dept. of Biological Sciences

READ MONTAGUE, Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University - Virginia Tech Carilion Research Institute

STEPHEN MORSE, University of Pennsylvania Law School

MARCUS E. RAICHLE, Washington University School of Medicine

JENNIFER A. RICHESON, Yale University - Department of Psychology

ELIZABETH S. SCOTT, Columbia University - Law School

LAURENCE STEINBERG, Temple University

KIM A. TAYLOR-THOMPSON, New York University School of Law

ANTHONY D. WAGNER, Stanford University - Psychology

The justice system in the United States has long recognized that juvenile offenders are not the same as adults, and has tried to incorporate those differences into law and policy. But only in recent decades have behavioral scientists and neuroscientists, along with policymakers, looked rigorously at developmental differences, seeking answers to two overarching questions: Are young offenders, purely by virtue of their immaturity, different from older individuals who commit crimes? And, if they are, how should justice policy take this into account?

A growing body of research on adolescent development now confirms that teenagers are indeed inherently different from adults, not only in their behaviors, but also (and of course relatedly) in the ways their brains function. These findings have influenced a series of Supreme Court decisions relating to the treatment of adolescents, and have led legislators and other policymakers across the country to adopt a range of developmentally informed justice policies.

New research is showing distinct changes in the brains of young adults, ages 18 to 21, suggesting that they too may be immature in ways that are relevant to justice policy. This knowledge brief from the MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and Neuroscience considers the implications of this new research.

"Dynamic Rationality"

Recently posted to SSRN: "Dynamic Rationality" 

STEPHANIE PLAMONDON BAIR, Brigham Young University J. Reuben Clark Law School

In 1998, Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, and Richard Thaler published A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, one of the most important pieces of scholarship in decades. Their Article famously proposes a departure from the classical law and economics approach to legal analysis. Breaking from classical law and economics’ rational actor construct, the authors apply empirical insights about human behavior to introduce the concept of a boundedly rational actor limited by cognitive constraints. Over the past two decades, the behavioral law and economics approach, with its focus on the boundedly rational actor, has contributed needed realism to legal analyses.

Unfortunately, the current approach to behavioral law and economics is incomplete. Indeed, sometimes it even conflicts with empirical lessons about how the brain actually works. In particular, rationality is not exogenous to policy, but instead has a dynamic character that can be molded in long-lasting ways over time by specific laws and policies. By overlooking the dynamic nature of rationality, behavioral law and economics cannot reach its full potential, and in fact, may harm the very people it is intended to benefit. A policy enacted to preserve consumer autonomy, for instance, may actually undermine autonomous decision-making in the long term.

In this Article, I take the first step in remedying this oversight. Drawing on the insights of neuroscience, I explain why rationality is endogenous and dynamic and what this means for behavioral law and economics. Working from examples in advertising and criminal law, I explain that dynamic rationality can and should be accounted for. Doing so will increase the prescriptive and normative power of behavioral law and economics and prevent policies from being introduced that undermine rather than advance social welfare.

"Can Neuroscience Contribute to Practical Ethics? A Critical Review and Discussion of the Methodological and Translational Challenges of the Neuroscience of Ethics"

Recently posted to SSRN: "Can Neuroscience Contribute to Practical Ethics? A Critical Review and Discussion of the Methodological and Translational Challenges of the Neuroscience of Ethics"

ERIC RACINE, Institut de recherches cliniques de Montréal

VELJKO DUBLJEVIĆ, Independent

BERNARD BAERTSCHI, University of Geneva

RALF J. JOX, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich

JULIA F. CHRISTENSEN, City University London

MICHELE FARISCO, Uppsala University - Centre for Research Ethics & Bioethics

FABRICE JOTTERAND, Medical College of Wisconsin

GUY KAHANE, University of Oxford – Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics

SABINE MULLER, Charité - Universitätsmedizin Berlin

Neuroethics is an interdisciplinary field that arose in response to novel ethical challenges posed by advances in neuroscience. Historically, neuroethics has provided an opportunity to synergize different disciplines, notably proposing a two‐way dialogue between an ‘ethics of neuroscience’ and a ‘neuroscience of ethics’. However, questions surface as to whether a ‘neuroscience of ethics’ is a useful and unified branch of research and whether it can actually inform or lead to theoretical insights and transferable practical knowledge to help resolve ethical questions. In this article, we examine why the neuroscience of ethics is a promising area of research and summarize what we have learned so far regarding its most promising goals and contributions. We then review some of the key methodological challenges which may have hindered the use of results generated thus far by the neuroscience of ethics. Strategies are suggested to address these challenges and improve the quality of research and increase neuroscience’s usefulness for applied ethics and society at large. Finally, we reflect on potential outcomes of a neuroscience of ethics and discuss the different strategies that could be used to support knowledge transfer to help different stakeholders integrate knowledge from the neuroscience of ethics.

"Respect for Autonomy in Light of Neuropsychiatry"

Recently posted to SSRN: "Respect for Autonomy in Light of Neuropsychiatry"

SABINE MULLER, Charité - Universitätsmedizin Berlin

Bioethics needs an elaborated concept of autonomy based on empirical knowledge about the prerequisites of the capacity of autonomy. Whereas Beauchamp and Childress, and many other bioethicists have discussed social influences on the capacity of autonomy in depth, neurobiological influences have received less attention. A comprehensive concept of autonomy should consider both social and biological factors that can diminish the capacity of autonomy. This article focuses on neurobiological influences that can reduce the capacity of autonomy. The thesis of this article is that the integration of neuropsychiatric knowledge into the concept of autonomy is essential for (1) evaluating demands for harmful medical treatments which might be caused by a brain disease, and (2) deciding on involuntary treatments of patients who suffer from substantial lack of autonomy due to neuropsychiatric disorders. Diametrically opposed to such a comprehensive concept of the capacity of autonomy is the concept of ‘liberty of illness’. In Germany, this concept is supported not only by anti‐psychiatric groups but also by the Federal Constitutional Court. Several real cases demonstrate how the brain can be ‘hijacked’ by parasites, antibodies or technical devices. Applying the concept of ‘liberty of illness’ to persons whose decision‐making capacity is severely affected by neuropsychiatric disorders is cynical. These patients neither chose their disease nor would refuse effective treatment if their will was not disturbed by the disease. Respect for autonomy should be understood as the positive obligation to save, support or restore the biological prerequisites of the capacity for autonomous decision‐making.

"Mind and Rights: Neuroscience, Philosophy and the Foundations of Legal Justice"

Recently posted to SSRN:  "Mind and Rights: Neuroscience, Philosophy and the Foundations of Legal Justice" 

MATTHIAS MAHLMANN, Chair of Legal Theory, Legal Sociology and International Public Law

The main question explored is: What is actually the relationship between human thought, its structure and exercise, and the idea of human rights, which is surely among the most important products of human thinking?

The first question will be: Why does the theory of mind matter for ethics and law? Second, the concept or idea of a human right as a subclass of moral and legal subjective rights used will be outlined and clarified to answer the question: What precisely are we talking about? Third, the question Where do rights come from? will occupy the attention just long enough to substantially understand why an answer to one of the two currently particularly interesting fundamental forms of human rights’ revisionism, the historical, genealogical attack on human rights, leads necessarily beyond the limits of human rights history in the deep waters of the epistemology and ontology of human rights and thus to those kinds of problems these remarks intend to explore. Fourth, the question Why are rights justified? will be considered. Fifth, after having sufficiently prepared the ground by the preceding remarks, the core issue of these reflections can be addressed: What is, after all, the importance of the theory of mind for the project of human rights? Here the second fundamental challenge to the idea of human rights will be discussed. This attack stems from the quarters of today’s neuroscientific neo-emotivism, which is interesting in itself and has the advantage that the critique of this form of human rights revisionism has considerable heuristic merits for a constructive account of the theory of mind and the foundations of human rights. How a theory of human rights could draw from the theory of mind, and more concretely from a mentalist account of ethics and law, to provide such a constructive account is the final perspective to be explored.