Neuroethics & Law Blog

"LIS and BCIs: a Local, Pluralist, and Pragmatist Approach to 4E Cognition"

"LIS and BCIs: a Local, Pluralist, and Pragmatist Approach to 4E Cognition" by Ruth Hibbert has been published in the most recent issue of Neuroethics:

Abstract

Four previous papers in this journal have discussed the role of Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCIs) in the lives of Locked-In Syndrome (LIS) patients in terms of the four “E” frameworks for cognition – extended, embedded, embodied, and enactive (also called enacted) cognition. This paper argues that in the light of more recent literature on these 4E frameworks, none of the four papers has taken quite the right approach to deciding which, if any, of the E frameworks is the best one for the job. More specifically, I argue for an approach that is pragmatist rather than purely metaphysical, pluralist rather than monist, and perhaps most importantly, local to particular research programmes, rather than about BCIs in general. The paper will outline this approach, then illustrate it with reference to a particular research programme which tackles the issue of BCI communication for patients in Complete Locked-In Syndrome (CLIS).

"What are Neural Correlates Neural Correlates of?"

"What are Neural Correlates Neural Correlates of?" by Gabriel Abend has recently been published in BioSocieties:

Abstract

How should neuroscience research about social-psychological phenomena identify its objects of inquiry, so as to develop adequate experimental paradigms and tasks to elicit them, and then look for their neural correlates? How should it go about conceptualizing objects such as morality, empathy, art, love, creativity, or religious belief? If a neuroscientist is after the neural correlates of X, how can she tell X from non-X? This is an important methodological problem, to which neuroscience hasn’t given enough thought. I argue that it actually consists of two distinct questions: first, what counts as object X; and second, how to tell what counts as object X. At neither level can neuroscientists avoid taking sides in philosophical and social science controversies. I further argue that they can therefore benefit from the relevant literatures in philosophy, social science, and the humanities. These literatures can help neuroscience studies better conceptualize and operationalize the social-psychological phenomena they are interested in—and thus better get at them, specify how experimental results might speak to the real social world, and clarify what exactly neural correlates are neural correlates of.

"Deep Brain Stimulation, Historicism, and Moral Responsibility"

"Deep Brain Stimulation, Historicism, and Moral Responsibility" by Daniel Sharp and David Wasserman has been published in the most recent issue of Neuroethics:

Abstract

Although philosophers have explored several connections between neuroscience and moral responsibility, the issue of how real-world neurological modifications, such as Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS), impact moral responsibility has received little attention. In this article, we draw on debates about the relevance of history and manipulation to moral responsibility to argue that certain kinds of neurological modification can diminish the responsibility of the agents so modified. We argue for a historicist position - a version of the history-sensitive reflection view - and defend that account against a rival, relational view of responsibility. We conclude that DBS can, under certain conditions, diminish responsibility, and explore the circumstances under which this might be so. We conclude by suggesting that philosophical debates about moral responsibility, manipulation, and history have greater practical relevance than is sometimes thought, and that attention to practical cases can help inform and deepen this body of scholarship.

PEBS Neuroethics Roundup (JHU)

Are You a Nice Person? Brain Scans Can Tell How Generous You Are, New Scientist   Brain's Chemical Signals Seen in Real Time, Nature Magazine Mental Alchemy, The Neuroethics Blog Making Music From Brainwaves: A History, Discover Magazine Scientists Now Know the Brain Chemistry Behind Pavlov’s Famous Dog Experiment, Quartz We Must Understand Electroshock Therapy’s Unwanted Side Effects, New Scientist The Brain's Face Recognition System Is Easy to Fool, Scientific American How an Algorithm Learned to Identify Depressed Individuals by Studying Their Instagram Photos, MIT Technology Review The Brain That Goes Through Phases: Temporal Metastates in fMRI, Discover Magazine Manufacturing Dopamine in the Brain with Gene Therapy, MIT Technology Review What to Do About Software Errors in fMRI?, Discover Magazine   Non-invasive ultrasonic thalamic stimulation in disorders of consciousness after severe brain injury: a first-in-man report, Brain Stimulation (In Press) Law, Science, and the Injured Mind, Alabama Law Review Population-Level Neural Codes Are Robust to Single-Neuron Variability from a Multidimensional Coding Perspective, Cell Reports Zika Virus Infects Neural Progenitors in the Adult Mouse Brain and Alters Proliferation, Stem Cell Cellular Resolution Circuit Mapping in Mouse Brain with Temporal-Focused Excitation of Soma-Targeted Channelrhodopsin, eLife Neuroscience or Neurospeculation? Peer Commentary on Four Articles Examining the Prevalence of Neuroscience in Criminal Cases Around the World, Journal of Law and the Biosciences

Subscribe to our mailing list The Program in Ethics and Brain Sciences (PEBS) is a collaborative effort of the Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics and the Johns Hopkins Brain Sciences Institute . The goal of PEBS is to ensure that research in brain science proceeds with an informed understanding of ethical issues, and that philosophical and empirical analyses of the advances in brain research proceed with an informed understanding of the science.

 

"The Movement of Research from the Laboratory to the Living Room: a Case Study of Public Engagement with Cognitive Science"

"The Movement of Research from the Laboratory to the Living Room: a Case Study of Public Engagement with Cognitive Science" by Tineke Broer, Martyn Pickersgill, and Ian J. Deary has been published in the most recent issue of Neuroethics:

Abstract

Media reporting of science has consequences for public debates on the ethics of research. Accordingly, it is crucial to understand how the sciences of the brain and the mind are covered in the media, and how coverage is received and negotiated. The authors report here their sociological findings from a case study of media coverage and associated reader comments of an article (‘Does bilingualism influence cognitive aging?’) from Annals of Neurology. The media attention attracted by the article was high for cognitive science; further, as associates/members of the Centre where it was produced, the authors of the research reported here had rare insight into how the scientists responsible for the Annals of Neurology article interacted with the media. The data corpus included 37 news items and 228 readers’ comments, examined via qualitative thematic analysis. Media coverage of the article was largely accurate, without merely copying the press release. Analysis of reader comments showed these to be an important resource for considering issues of import to neuroethics scholars, as well as to scientists themselves (including how science communication shapes and is shaped by ethical, epistemic, and popular discourse). In particular, the findings demonstrate how personal experiences were vital in shaping readers’ accounts of their (dis)agreements with the scientific article. Furthermore, the data show how scientific research can catalyse political discussions in ways likely unanticipated by scientists. The analysis indicates the importance of dialogue between journalists, laboratory scientists and social scientists in order to support the communication of the messages researchers intend.

  

"Irrationality and Pathology of Beliefs"

"Irrationality and Pathology of Beliefs" by Eisuke Sakakibara has been published in the most recent issue of Neuroethics:

Abstract

Just as sadness is not always a symptom of mood disorder, irrational beliefs are not always symptoms of illness. Pathological irrational beliefs are distinguished from non-pathological ones by considering whether their existence is best explained by assuming some underlying dysfunctions. The features from which to infer the pathological nature of irrational beliefs are: un-understandability of their progression; uniqueness; coexistence with other psycho-physiological disturbances and/or concurrent decreased levels of functioning; bizarreness of content; preceding organic diseases known to be associated with irrational beliefs; treatment response to medical intervention, etc. Severe irrationality is sometimes caused by normal human motivation rather than by mental or physical dysfunction. Pure forms of self-deception may satisfy the diagnostic criteria of delusional disorder, but there may be no evidence that suggests that they are caused by illness. Although those with pathological delusions do not recognize their delusions as symptomatic of illness, differentiating pathological beliefs from normal irrational beliefs is vitally important: If a belief is pathological, psychiatrists must seriously consider treating the patient against her will. If it is not pathological, conversely, involuntary treatments are prohibited because they offend her basic autonomy.

"21 Selected Abstracts from the Montreal Neuroethics Conference for Young Researchers"

"21 Selected Abstracts from the Montreal Neuroethics Conference for Young Researchers" by Veljko Dubljevic has been published in the most recent issue of Neuorethics:

Abstract

The organizers and members of the international abstract review committee conducted anonymous review of all abstracts from the conference for merit based on relevance, originality, strength and clarity of methods and analyses, and overall contribution to the field of neuroethics. Here, we proudly introduce the collection of 21 top-ranked abstracts for the poster contest.

"Psychopathy, Mental Time Travel, and Legal Responsibility"

"Psychopathy, Mental Time Travel, and Legal Responsibility" by Andrew Vierra has been published in the most recent issue of Neuroethics: 

Abstract

Neil Levy argues that the degree to which psychopaths ought to be held blameworthy for their actions depends on the extent to which they are capable of mental time travel—episodic memory and episodic foresight. Levy claims that deficits in mental time travel prevent psychopaths from fully appreciating what it is to be a person, and, without this understanding, we can at best hold psychopaths blameworthy for harming non-persons. In this paper, I build upon and clarify various aspects of Levy’s view. Specifically, I begin by outlining the neurobiological data on mental time travel, and I argue that psychopaths, or at least some psychopaths, appear to have the deficits Levy ascribes to them. I then expand upon the legal implications of his argument by using an analogy between juveniles and psychopaths to argue that the penological justification for retributive punishment against psychopaths ought to be substantially diminished.

"A Defense of Brain Death"

"A Defense of Brain Death" by Nada Gligorov has been published in the most recent issue of Neuroethics: 

Abstract

In 1959 two French neurologists, Pierre Mollaret and Maurice Goullon, coined the term coma dépassé to designate a state beyond coma. In this state, patients are not only permanently unconscious; they lack the endogenous drive to breathe, as well as brainstem reflexes, indicating that most of their brain has ceased to function. Although legally recognized in many countries as a criterion for death, brain death has not been universally accepted by bioethicists, by the medical community, or by the public. I this paper, I defend brain death as a biological concept. I challenge two assumptions in the brain death literature that have shaped the debate and have stood in the way of an argument for brain death as biological. First, I challenge the dualism established in the debate between the body and the brain. Second, I contest the emphasis on consciousness, which prevents the inclusion of psychological phenomena into a biological criterion of death. I propose that the term organism should apply both to the functioning of the body and the brain. I argue that the cessation of the organism as a whole should take into account three elements of integrated function. Those three elements are: 1) the loss of integrated bodily function; 2) the loss of psychophysical integration required for processing of external stimuli and those required for behavior; and, 3) the loss of integrated psychological function, such as memory, learning, attention, and so forth. The loss of those three elements of integrated function is death.

"Incarceration, Direct Brain Intervention, and the Right to Mental Integrity – a Reply to Thomas Douglas"

"Incarceration, Direct Brain Intervention, and the Right to Mental Integrity - a Reply to Thomas Douglas" by Jared N. Craig has been published in the most recent issue of Neuroethics: 

Abstract 

In recent years, direct brain interventions (DBIs) have shown increased success in manipulating neurobiological processes often associated with moral reasoning and decision-making. As current DBIs are refined, and new technologies are developed, the state will have an interest in administering DBIs to criminal offenders for rehabilitative purposes. However, it is generally assumed that the state is not justified in directly intruding in an offender’s brain without valid consent. Thomas Douglas challenges this view. The state already forces criminal offenders to go to jail without their consent. This represents a serious interference with an offender’s rights. If criminal offenders are already morally liable to incarceration, why is the state not also entitled to administer DBIs without consent for the purposes of rehabilitation? Douglas argument focuses on the right to ‘bodily integrity’. He argues that there is no compelling reason to believe that bodily rights that protect an offender from non-consensual DBIs are stronger than rights that protect an offender from incarceration. This paper will extend Douglas’ analysis. It will consider the more fundamental right to ‘mental integrity’. The right to mental integrity defends an inner sphere of liberty. It protects critical capacities necessary for the exercise of autonomous human agency—without which a vast majority of moral rights could not exist. Thus, the right to mental integrity is ultimately more important for a moral assessment of DBIs. The right strongly suggests that both presently, and in the future, there may be many cases in which the state is not entitled to administer DBIs to criminal offenders without valid consent.

"The Impact of Biological Psychiatry on the Law: Evidence, Blame and Social Solidarity"

Recently Published on SSRN (and forthcoming in Alberta Law Review):

 

"The Impact of Biological Psychiatry on the Law: Evidence, Blame and Social Solidarity"  

JENNIFER A. CHANDLER, University of Ottawa - Common Law Section

This article explores the impact of biological psychiatry as the present dominant frame for understanding mental disorder on legal rules and practices. It begins with a brief overview of biological psychiatry, showing that biological understandings of mental disorder have ancient origins in Western thought, but have ebbed and flowed in popularity over time, coexisting sometimes acrimoniously with other models of mental disorder. This section presents and explains the dominance today of neuroscientific approaches within a historical context. I then present ways in which I suggest that the neurobiological model of mental disorder will affect the law in five areas: evidence of mental states, the definition of disability in human rights law, criminal responsibility, the regulation of brain interventions, and the regulation of reproductive technologies. Some of these are admittedly speculative, but are advanced as suggestions for further attention as neuroscientific research proceeds and is incorporated within social institutions and practices, such as the law.

"Intuitive Error Rate Estimates for the Forensic Sciences"

Recently Published on SSRN:

 

"Intuitive Error Rate Estimates for the Forensic Sciences" 

 

JONATHAN J. KOEHLER, Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law

There is a risk of error associated with all forensic science conclusions. However, no proper studies have been conducted in any of the forensic sciences to estimate the rate at which forensic science conclusions are wrong. As a result, jurors and other consumers of forensic science information are left to speculate about what those error rates might be. The present paper provides data from an online study (n = 210) about what jury-eligible people (“jurors”) think the false positive error rates are for five types of forensic science evidence (DNA, fingerprints, bite marks, microscopic hair, and handwriting). Jurors’ median estimates range from a high of 1 in 100,000 (handwriting) to a low of 1 in 1,000,000,000 (DNA). The significance of these estimated false positive error rates is discussed.

"The Bright Future of Neuroethics"

"The Bright Future of Neuroethics" by Veljko Dubljevic, Victoria H. Saigle, and Eric Racine has been published in the most recent issue of Neuroethics: 

Abstract 

Many new scholars have emerged and started to explore novel directions of research in neuroethics. Last year, we hosted the Montreal Neuroethics Conference for Young Researchers to highlight the development of these new scholars and to honour the evolving complexity of the field. As part of this conference, we invited young researchers involved in neuroethics all around the world to submit their work for consideration in an essay contest. Here, we proudly introduce the three best essays we received for this competition and a collection of 21 top-ranked abstracts for the poster contest.

"Cognitive Emotion and the Law"

Recently Published on SSRN:

 

"Cognitive Emotion and the Law" 

 

HAROLD ANTHONY LLOYD, Wake Forest University School of Law

Many wrongly believe that emotion plays little or no role in legal reasoning. Unfortunately, Langdell and his “scientific” case method encourage this error. A careful review of analysis in the real world, however, belies this common belief. Emotion can be cognitive and cognition can be emotional. Additionally, modern neuroscience underscores the “co-dependence” of reason and emotion. Thus, even if law were a certain science of appellate cases (which it is not), emotion could not be torn from such “science.”

As we reform legal education, we must recognize the role of cognitive emotion in law and legal analysis. If we fail to do this, we shortchange law schools, students, and the bar in grievous ways. We shortchange the very basics of true and best legal analysis. We shortchange at least half the universe of expression (the affective half). We shortchange the importance of watching and guarding the true interests of our clients, which interests are inextricably intertwined with affective experience. We shortchange the importance of motivation in law, life, and legal education. How can lawyers understand the motives of clients and other relevant parties without understanding the emotions that motivate them? How can lawyers hope to persuade judges, other advocates, or parties across the table in a transaction without grasping affective experience that motivates them? How can law professors fully engage students while ignoring affective experience that motivates students? Finally, we shortchange matters of life and death: emotions affect health and thus the very vigor of the bar.

Using insights from practice, modern neuroscience, and philosophy, I therefore explore emotion and other affective experience through a lawyer’s lens. In doing this, I reject claims that emotion and other affective experience are mere feeling (though I do not discount the importance of feeling). I also reject claims that emotion and other affective experience are necessarily irrational or beyond our control. Instead, such experience is often intentional and quite rational and controllable. After exploring law and affective experience at more “macro” levels, I consider three more specific examples of the interaction of law and emotion: (i) emotion, expression, and the first amendment, (ii) emotion in legal elements and exceptions, and (iii) emotion and lawyer mental health. To provide lawyers and legal scholars with a “one-source” overview of emotion and the law, I have also included an Appendix addressing a number of particular emotions.

"The Place for Neuroscience in Criminal Law"

Recently published on SSRN (and Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2806641):

 

"The Place for Neuroscience in Criminal Law" 

DEBORAH W. DENNO, Fordham Law School

The last thirty years have seen an explosion of neuroscience research on how the mind functions. This research paints a revised image of what constitutes human nature and behavior and how the criminal law can handle those extremes of it that endanger individuals and their society. The revision is important to the criminal law because key criminal law concepts of culpability depend on the internal workings of individuals’ minds. Research into intentionality, consciousness, and brain plasticity are just some examples of areas where new discoveries could help enhance validity and reliability within the criminal justice system. Not surprisingly, lawyers have increasingly introduced neuroscience evidence into the courtroom, a trend suggesting that the complexity of the legal issues raised will only expand as the science progresses. On a more fundamental level, neuroscience is also an excellent resource to revitalize the Model Penal Code’s original focus on subjective determinations of an individual defendant’s blameworthiness, based on that particular defendant’s mental state. Over the last sixty years, the American criminal justice system has become far more punitive, and the subjective inquiry has been overshadowed by a more objective standard that downplays the need to assess individual culpability. The incorporation of modern neuroscience research into the criminal law would bring back a system of justice that more accurately reflects a given defendant’s mental state as well more effectively protects the rest of society. But to benefit from neuroscience in this way, we must first penetrate the mystique that often surrounds the meaning and applicability of the science. We must move on from misconceptions, fears, and misguided debates. And we must realize that although neuroscience brings unique insight to the law, there is nothing about neuroscience that merits unique treatment by the law.