Recently published on SSRN (and forthcoming in: Journal of Law and Crime Sciences (2016)):
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Recently published on SSRN (and forthcoming in: Journal of Law and Crime Sciences (2016)):
Posted by NELB Staff on 06/27/2016 at 09:38 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)
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Posted by NELB Staff on 06/27/2016 at 09:24 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)
Joshua Stein is a guest blogger at Neuroethics and Law; he is a doctoral student in philosophy at the University of Calgary, with a background in bioethics and philosophy of science.
I checked twitter in the middle of the night, a compulsion shared by many folks my age, and a colleague had posted an article summarizing a recent talk by Eric Lander, the co-chair of the President's Council on Science and Technology and one of the major contributors to Project Moonshot, the current administration's push to "cure" cancer. (Or, on more modest interpretations, make cancer a chronic and manageable condition.)
Lander's work, in particular, focuses on gathering data on the individual genome in order to develop treatments. Now, there are various criticisms of Lander's work as misguided; I'm inclined to think those criticisms are right, but I'm not going to delve into the scientific literature. Hal Burstein and Vinay Prasad (the folks who brought the article into my twitter feed) are better commentators for that discussion.
(A rough summary of the concern advanced by Burstein and Prasad, as I understand it: Having access to more information is not clearly to the advantage of the patient or researcher. There is good reason to suppose that genetic information actually is not particularly useful in studying most cancer, and therefore building a large database like this includes a massive commitment of resources without clear benefit.)
I want to focus on something that I think is ethically problematic (if not downright wrong) with Lander's project.
In the course of the discussion, Karen Weintraub (the reporter who wrote the article) notes that one of Lander's major goals is to create a massive database of genetic information about patients, something that is problematic for a number of reasons. (Hospitals don't want to give up such data; patients have to give consent for data to be shared; etc.) Lander wants patients to give consent for their medical information, particularly genetic information, to be used in medical research; now, this (in itself) is not a problem.
(Weintraub sent me an email to clarify the context and content of Lander's comments; that has been taken into consideration here.)
Patients have a right to control their genetic information. While Lander says, "We should force the liberation of people’s own medical records," this is really just an unfortunate phrasing without context. What he means is that we should get patients to give consent to share their medical information; not "force the liberation" in any coercive sense.
But this is where I change gears, because even on a weak sense of what Lander means here, considered in tandem with the way that his projects have gone about gathering medical data, it is ethically problematic.
The major project cited in the article, and perhaps the largest push for this work, is the Metastatic Breast Cancer Project. The MBCP homepage is a push to convince patients with metastatic breast cancer to send genetic and personal information in for research. Again, this in itself is not morally problematic. If you have a condition and there are reasons to believe that there are genetic components to that condition then genetic information is a sensible part of a research program. The problem is that Lander et al. have not met the conditions to get consent from the patient.
Suppose Sally, a layperson with metastatic breast cancer, visits the homepage for the MBCP. She looks over the information and decides she is going to send material. The standard view of informed consent for research, as articulated by the FDA, requires that "the investigator has not persuaded or influenced the research subject."
Now, MBCP will try and inform Sally (to the best of their ability given her background knowledge) about the research being done, increase her awareness of possible risks and treatment options, etc. And that's all terrific; that is really the best standard we can hope for in medical research, that the process of participating in the research includes educating the patient about what they're participating in. (Though there is a practical question about how widely used this genetic information will be, and whether they are genuinely keeping patients appraised of all of the uses; let's be charitable and assume that they're doing all of that well.)
The problem is that the MBCP homepage itself, and the various efforts associated with recruiting individuals and encouraging them to share genetic information is an overt effort to persuade and influence the research subject's decision; it is unethical, eo ipso, to try to convince patients to participate in your research program. Even if we are as charitable as possible to Lander and the MBCP, and even if we assume that all of the research they're doing is clearly communicated to patients, it is clear that Lander is persuading and influencing patients to offer up their information for research.
For many readers outside of medical research, or perhaps even researchers themselves, some wonder, "why is this important?" After all, a researcher wants her research program to succeed and is therefore in a position to encourage patients to participate.
I won't delve too much into the historical and more technical concerns, but this is an important question. It seems quite reasonable, superficially, to expect researchers to express excitement and focus on the benefits of their research, actively encouraging patients they interact with to participate. The problem is that medical authority matters, and the presentation of an experimental treatment or program as decidedly beneficial communicated by a doctor and researcher (someone in a privileged position, both from the standpoint of information and as a matter of the social dynamics of treatment) exploits an existing asymmetry with the patient. That is not to say that patients will feel coerced; perhaps they too are genuinely excited about the research! But they're in a position where the influence of the proximate expert (that researcher, doctor, etc.) is really their primary guiding light, and if that expert is influencing the patient to choose one thing or another, it undermines the agency of the patient.
Posted by Joshua Stein on 06/27/2016 at 01:01 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)
Tags: big data, cancer, consent, data, ethics, fda, genetics, information, informed consent
Story here.
Posted by Adam Kolber on 06/27/2016 at 10:44 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)
Posted by NELB Staff on 06/17/2016 at 07:39 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)
Recently published on SSRN (and forthcoming in Mental Health Law & Policy Journal):
"A Neuro-Legal Lingua Franca: Bridging Law and Neuroscience on the Issue of Self-Control"
Posted by NELB Staff on 06/17/2016 at 07:27 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)
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Posted by NELB Staff on 06/16/2016 at 07:23 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)
This is a guest post by Joshua Stein; I am guest blogging through the month of June, though I've been a bit inactive during the first half of the month. Hopefully the second half will see more on this site. Thanks to Adam for inviting me.
Perhaps the best place to start is the piece of writing that got me this gig guest blogging at Neuroethics and Law this month. The article, recently published in Neuroethics, is motivated by a response to one of the most controversial sets of articles in recent ethics literature: the (in) famous after-birth abortion papers. Most importantly is Tooley's 1972 paper "Abortion and Infanticide" and the more recent rehash provocatively titled "After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?" (2013) by Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva.
Like many such seminal and provocative papers, they're worth a read even if the conclusion is so wild that the argument is almost certain to be unconvincing. The purpose of the papers is to argue that there is no substantive difference in moral status between the fetus and the infant; as a result we should not regard the infant as having a prima facie right to life, since the standard philosophical view is that the fetus has no such right. I suppose that this is an interesting argument, with the caveat that individual moral status is not the only thing that determines the permissibility of killing. (Perhaps this is not obvious to everyone; I take it that there's good independent reason to accept that claim.)
The problem with these articles is that they rest on a sort of simple formulation of how moral status works: "x has moral status just in case x has some capacity c."
Different accounts of moral status have different accounts of the relevant capacities, and some allow for the possibility that there are several different capacities. For those who want my response to the particular capacity that is used by Tooley, and why it doesn't work, the article will hopefully prove a worthwhile read. However, the general concern is worth noting: For any account that requires a simple status (i.e. can be formulated in the way expressed above), especially a cognitively oriented status, there may be some actual neuroatypical adults who don't have that capacity, or at least seem to be unclear cases.
My note on the Tooley/G&M account of moral status focuses on people with certain severe varieties of depression, as their account focuses on desires directed at living; but there are other accounts that cognitive capacities ranging from psychological continuity to social capacities to linguistic capacities and on and on. It is important to regard these accounts with a critical and skeptical eye, because there is a lot of neurodiversity and, in the vast majority of cases, we recognize the moral status of neuroatypical persons. (I do note in the paper that some folks may want to deny the moral status in certain cases, and that's certainly a live option, but it also isn't the default position.) Many of the early discussions of moral status, put forward by Dennett, Warren, inter alia, are multi-conditional and avoid this issue, despite making the conversation much more complicated.
Neurodiversity is, in many cases, a thought experiment made immediate and important, and the way that we handle cognitive difference (and similarity) within members of our own species and beyond has been one of the most important ongoing discussions in both theoretical and applied ethics. There are many hard cases that I think require paper-length discussion, and perhaps even book-length discussion, and probably aren't going to see any real progress in a blog entry. (Severe cases of major depressive disorder get that treatment in my article; there are further books to be written on Alzheimers', understanding the status of children, of animals, of individuals with dissociated identities, etc.)
The depression case is one such instance; when we consider the moral status of a set of individuals based on the presence or absence of a certain cognitive feature, updates to our account of those individuals bear on the larger set of individuals, and this is the challenge with the available discussion of the relationship between infanticide and depression. One of the challenges that I want to put forward as a serious methodological consideration for those doing ethics and metaethics is to consider neurodiversity when looking at proposals for developing conceptual and normative frameworks. While there are disputes about how well the method of cases works at fleshing out logical space, getting cases in the actual world right seems like a rather important priority.
Posted by Joshua Stein on 06/15/2016 at 12:14 PM | Permalink | Comments (3)
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Posted by NELB Staff on 06/13/2016 at 08:24 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)
A recent Washington Post article discusses why researchers from Stanford University studying the effect of stem cells injected directly into the brains of stroke patients said that they were "stunned" by the extent to which the experimental treatment restored motor function in some of the patients.
Posted by NELB Staff on 06/05/2016 at 10:29 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)
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Posted by NELB Staff on 06/04/2016 at 04:49 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)