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Posted by NELB Staff on 03/16/2015 at 08:10 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)
Posted by NELB Staff on 03/10/2015 at 09:27 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)
Recently published in Handbook of Neuroethics 1279 (2014):
"A Duty to Remember, a Right to Forget? Memory Manipulations and the Law"
Neuroscience might develop interventions that afford editing or erasing memories, changing their content or attenuating accompanying emotions. This section provides an introduction to the intriguing ethical and legal questions raised by such alterations, with a special focus on the report of the President’s Council “Beyond Therapy” and the proposal of a right to freedom of memory advanced by Adam Kolber.
Posted by NELB Staff on 03/10/2015 at 05:27 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)
Recently published in Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine:
"Erasing traumatic memories: when context and social interests can outweigh personal autonomy"
Neuroscientific research on the removal of unpleasant and traumatic memories is still at a very early stage, but is making rapid progress and has stirred a significant philosophical and neuroethical debate. Even if memory is considered to be a fundamental element of personal identity, in the context of memory-erasing the autonomy of decision-making seems prevailing. However, there seem to be situations where the overall context in which people might choose to intervene on their memories would lead to view those actions as counterproductive. In this article, I outline situations where the so-called composition effects can produce negative results for everyone involved, even if the individual decisions are not as such negative. In such situations medical treatments that usually everyone should be free to take, following the principle of autonomy, can make it so that the personal autonomy of the individuals in the group considered is damaged or even destroyed. In these specific cases, in which what is called the “conformity to context” prevails, the moral admissibility of procedures of memory-erasing is called into question and the principle of personal autonomy turns out to be subordinate to social interests benefitting every member of the group.
Posted by NELB Staff on 03/08/2015 at 09:21 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)
Recently sent to the Neuroethics & Law Blog:
"Justice without Retribution Conference"
An Interdisciplinary Conference on the Legal and Social Implications of Rejecting the Retributive Conceptions of Free Will and Responsibility.
For centuries, certain philosophers have argued that our everyday concepts of free will and responsibility are misguided. New neuroscientific findings have given added impetus to such critiques. Free will sceptics often point out that their view undermines the retributive justification of punishment, but they are only just beginning to develop positive accounts of what our legal system would look like if we abandoned all retributive ideas (see, e.g., Derk Pereboom (2001), Living without Free Will. Oxford: OUP). According to retributivists, the outcome would be disastrous. They warn that the only way to treat offenders as persons rather than objects is to recognise that they are ‘free’ and ‘responsible’ in the retributive sense of these words; they insist that abandoning ‘just deserts’ means abandoning justice. These concerns may partly explain the growing tendency of philosophers to favour compatibilist solutions to the free will problem (see The Philpapers Survey 2011 http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl, for the latest data on the rise of compatibilism among academic philosophers).
The purpose of this conference is to move beyond the traditional debate about whether we have free will and consider whether free will sceptics can provide a convincing non-retributive conception of justice and respect for persons that can help us tackle current legal problems. This shift in focus is particularly timely. Recently, two important conferences (resulting in edited collections) have brought together leading compatibilists to work out the implications of their position for contemporary legal and social issues (see Vincent, N A, van de Poel, I & van den Hoven, J (eds) (2011). Moral Responsibility: beyond free will & determinism. Dordrecht, NL: Springer; and Vincent, N A (ed) (2012). Neuroscience and Legal Responsibility. New York, NY, USA: OUP.). The conference will provide a forum for free will sceptics to present an alternative approach to these real-world challenges.
Posted by NELB Staff on 03/07/2015 at 09:20 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)
Posted by NELB Staff on 03/06/2015 at 06:11 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)
Posted by NELB Staff on 03/05/2015 at 06:09 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)
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Posted by NELB Staff on 03/05/2015 at 02:06 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)