Gregg Caruso on "The Dark Side of Free Will":
« November 2014 | Main | January 2015 »
Gregg Caruso on "The Dark Side of Free Will":
Posted by Adam Kolber on 12/13/2014 at 08:03 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)
|
Posted by NELB Staff on 12/12/2014 at 05:03 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)
Here's a recap of my posts during a recent guest blogging stint at Prawfsblawg:
Posted by Adam Kolber on 12/09/2014 at 03:09 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)
A New York appellate court has ruled that a chimpanzee is not a "person" entitled to state habeas corpus protections. Hence the Nonhuman Rights Project cannot get an order to show cause to commence a habeas proceeding to challenge the confinement of Tommy the chimpanzee (who is apparently being kept in accordance with state and federal animal welfare laws).
The court reasoned that there is no precedent for treating chimps as persons and that personhood ought not be extended because the rights associated with the writ have "historically been connected with the imposition of societal obligations and duties" (emphasis added). "Under this view, society extends rights in exchange for an express or implied agreement from its members to submit to social responsibilities." Since chimps do not accept legal responsibilities, they ought not have the rights of persons.
As to why humans that are too young or too intellectually disabled to have legal duties are still persons, the court states in a footnote: "To be sure, some humans are less able to bear legal duties or responsibilities than others. These differences do not alter our analysis, as it is undeniable that, collectively, human beings possess the unique ability to bear legal responsibility. Accordingly, nothing in this decision should be read as limiting the rights of human beings in the context of habeas corpus proceedings or otherwise."
The court's position exemplifies what Peter Singer and others call speciesism. What entitles a being to protection, according to the court, is not something about the creature itself but about its membership in a particular group--namely, the species homo sapiens. If sexism is an irrational prejudice in favor of one gender and racism is an irrational prejudice in favor of one race over another, to many animal rights advocates, specisism is an irrational prejudice in favor of one species over another. So how one feels about the decision likely turns on how seriously one takes the charge of speciesism.
In this case, there is apparently no allegation that Tommy was being mistreated in the sense protected by current animal welfare laws. Often, however, even when animal welfare laws are being violated, private parties lack standing to bring suit. So questions of personhood for great apes and other animals both raise fundamental questions about the nature of personhood and less fundamental, but still important issues, about how expansively animal welfare protections apply.
(Hat tip: Eugene Volokh) (This post originally appeared at Prawfsblawg.)
Posted by Adam Kolber on 12/08/2014 at 04:55 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)
|
Last Edition's Most Popular Article(s):
In The Popular Press:
In the Academic Literature:
|
||
|
Posted by NELB Staff on 12/07/2014 at 04:53 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)
In my last post, I raised the admittedly speculative possibility that advances in artificial intelligence will lead the law to concretize (by which I mean that it will become more clearly expressed and more transparently applied). I gave the example of autonomous cars which may lead manufacturers to push for more concretized speed limits (unlike the ones we have now in which it's unlikely you'll get ticketed if you travel a little above the speed limit). Superficial appearances aside, actual speed limits are neither clearly expressed nor transparently applied.
Let me offer two more reasons why the law may concretize. First, the law may become more concrete as computers play a larger role in making legally relevant decisions. For example, a group of German researchers is working to develop a computer system “to make automatic decisions on child benefit claims to the country’s Federal Employment Agency . . . probably with some human auditing of its decisions behind the scenes” and is in talks with the agency about how to deploy it. One researcher “hopes that one day, new laws will be drafted with machines in mind from the start, so that each is built as a structured database containing all of the law’s concepts, and information on how the concepts relate to one another.” In other words, when legally relevant tasks are performed by computers, legislation may itself be crafted more algorithmically to facilitate processing. That is a kind of concretization although whether or not such laws are clearer than current laws may be a matter of taste (and of whether you’re a human or a computer).
Second, the law might concretize by creating greater pressure to clarify the theoretical underpinnings of the law. For example, many copyright holders already use automated software systems to scan the Internet looking for copyright violations. Some users make constitutionally protected “fair use” of others’ copyrighted material, but it is difficult to know precisely what constitutes fair use. Before the Internet age, copying audio, visual, and written materials was more difficult, so there was less need to police violations. Furthermore, it was more expensive to police each violation when you could not simply search for violations on the Internet. Thus, fair use determinations were made less frequently. In the Internet age, such determinations are made much more frequently, and there is more political pressure to understand the principles underlying fair-use doctrine in order to make the law more concrete.
In the future, such pressures may apply to some of the most central questions facing moral and legal philosophers. Consider the tricky theoretical issues that underlie the famous trolley thought experiments: A runaway trolley is heading toward five entirely innocent people who are, for some reason, strapped to the trolley tracks. If the trolley continues along its current path, all five will die. You can flip a switch to divert the trolley to an alternate track, but it will still kill one innocent person strapped to the alternate track.
This trolley problem and its numerous variations raise interesting questions about when it is mandatory or permissible to take an action that will save several lives, when the action will also knowingly cause the death of some smaller number of people. There is no consensus solution to all trolley problems. Nevertheless, autonomous agents, especially unmanned military drones, will likely be confronted with real-life trolley problems. We will want these entities to follow rules of some sort, but we cannot program those rules unless we agree on what they should be. It is possible that we will have different rules for humans and nonhumans, but we will at least have to codify some rules for autonomous machines that will require more theoretical clarity and agreement than we have today.
Of course, humans already face trolley-like situations from time-to-time, and we still do not have clear rules to follow. The difference, however, is that after humans have confronted an emergency situation, there is usually quite a bit of uncertainty about what they knew and when they knew it. With autonomous entities, we will know more precisely what information the entity had available to it and how it was processed. Indeed, we will typically have video footage of the pertinent events, along with all of the other data available to the entity. Being clear about the rules is more important when we can no longer hide behind ambiguous facts.
(This post is adapted from "Will There Be a Neurolaw Revolution?" and originally appeared at Prawfsblawg.)
Posted by Adam Kolber on 12/05/2014 at 04:55 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)
In recent decades, progress in artificial intelligence has been widely considered disappointing. The tide may have changed, however. Reasonably good voice recognition software is now widely available. Websites like Facebook and Google can translate a snippet from a foreign language, at least in a pinch. And facial recognition is surprisingly accurate. Now, increasingly autonomous vehicles appear to be on the horizon.
In an admittedly speculative portion of a recent paper, I argue that such technologies, especially autonomous vehicles, may lead law to "concretize" by which I mean that it will become more clearly expressed and more transparently applied. The law might concretize because rules for autonomous entities have to be described with some precision. We cannot so easily rely on the ability of computers to understand human attitudes and conventions. But if we can develop self-driving cars that recognize pedestrians, road debris, and traffic signs, the cars can surely recognize that it is generally permissible to drive a few miles-per-hour above the posted speed limit.
A more significant push to concretize may emerge from corporations that design self-driving cars. They will fear the accident liability from even de minimis vehicle infractions, like driving a little bit above the speed limit. So the law may concretize as corporations push for convergence between laws on the books and the laws that we are expected to follow. More concretized speed limits, for example, may be somewhat faster than those we have now but with more strict enforcement around the limit.
After my article was published, Google announced that it has programmed the autonomous vehicles it is testing to go up to ten miles-per-hour above the speed limit. I can certainly believe that it is sometimes safer to exceed the speed limit, but it is still surprising that a corporate juggernaut would program its cars to so easily break the law. We'll see, though, what happens when autonomous vehicles become more mainstream. I suspect that there will still be a push to make speed limits more transparent to facilitate compliance by autonomous vehicles.
(This post is adapted from "Will There Be a Neurolaw Revolution?" and originally appeared at Prawfsblawg.)
Posted by Adam Kolber on 12/03/2014 at 02:10 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)
Here's a recap of my recent posts during a guest blogging sting at Prawfsblawg:
Posted by Adam Kolber on 12/02/2014 at 02:57 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)
|
Last Edition's Most Popular Article(s):
In The Popular Press:
In the Academic Literature:
|
||
|
Posted by NELB Staff on 12/01/2014 at 11:05 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)