"In my view, neuroscience does not offer us anything new that cannot be responsibly incorporated into existing substantive criminal law doctrine," says Steven K. Erickson in a
new paper that largely questions fellow law professor, Adam Lamparello's effort in promoting neuroscience to aide in predicting future conduct or dangerousness of offenders, thereby supporting civil commitment terms (after prison terms) for offenders with neurobiological impairments which may cause them to re-offend.
Surprisingly, Erickson allows that neuroanatomical attributes impact behavior (which is interesting given "The idea that behavior is determined by physical causes is hard to reconcile with the intuitive notions of free will and moral agency on which our legal systems are based"
via), even highlighting a few of congintive neuroscience's basic principles: "...all human experiences are reducible, machines such as fMRI can reveal human thought, and predictions about human behavior can be made from the knowledge gained through reduction and technology." But he calls out Professor Lamparello for confusing the relevancy and purpose of raising neuroscience's place in the law when dealing with neurologically impaired offenders, calling it "unwise and unnecessary" since "substantive criminal law in most jurisdictions already affords such agents a plea of non-responsibility that is harmonious with the principles of deterrence and deserved punishment". Erickson ties his argument neatly in a bow with, "Propensities are not destinies, and we are free to act against our urges, whatever biological liabilities may encumber us". Although I agree with many of Erickson's points, this last one is certainly a red flag for researchers.
*The exact paper(s) of which this paper critiques is not mentioned. From a quick search, I'm left to guess Erickson is responding to the paper(s) below.
Erickson, Steven K., The Limits of Neurolaw (June 4, 2011). Houston Journal of Health Law and Policy, Vol. 11, 2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1857971
Lamparello, Adam, Cognitive Neuroscience and Involuntary Confinement: The Model Statute (January 18, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1743179
Lamparello, Adam, Using Cognitive Neuroscience as a Method by Which to Involuntarily Confine Violent Offenders after Completion of Their Sentence (January 18, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1742940
Lamparello, Adam, Why Wait Until the Crime Happens? Providing for the Involuntary Commitment of Dangerous Individuals Without Requiring a Showing of Mental Illness (January 18, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1742933
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