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Posted by Adam Kolber on 04/30/2010 at 11:29 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)
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Posted by Adam Kolber on 04/30/2010 at 11:25 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)
From the current issue of Neuroethics:
Fabrice Jotterand1, 2 , Shawn M. McClintock1, 3, Archie A. Alexander4 and Mustafa M. Husain2
(1) | Department of Clinical Sciences, UT Southwestern Medical Center, Dallas, TX, USA |
(2) | Department of Psychiatry, UT Southwestern Medical Center, Dallas, TX, USA |
(3) | Department of Psychiatry, Division of Brain Stimulation and Therapeutic Modulation, New York State Psychiatric Institute, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA |
(4) | Independent Consultant for Health Law, Policy and Bioethics, Austin, TX, USA |
Received: 1 July 2009 Accepted: 14 September 2009 Published online: 12 January 2010
Posted by Adam Kolber on 04/29/2010 at 11:49 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)
In the current issue of Neuroethics:
(1) | Department of Philosophy, University of Turku, 20014 Turku, Finland |
Received: 14 October 2009 Accepted: 19 January 2010 Published online: 2 February 2010
Posted by Adam Kolber on 04/28/2010 at 09:47 AM | Permalink | Comments (1)
Published in the current issue of Neuroethics:
Eric Racine1, 2, 3 and Cynthia Forlini1, 2
(1) | Institut de recherches cliniques de Montréal, Montreal, Canada |
(2) | Université de Montréal, Montreal, Canada |
(3) | McGill University, Montreal, Canada |
Received: 16 July 2008 Accepted: 31 July 2008 Published online: 4 September 2008
Posted by Adam Kolber on 04/27/2010 at 02:44 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)
Recently posted to SSRN:
"Realism, Punishment & Reform"
University of Chicago Law Review, ForthcomingPAUL H. ROBINSON, University of Pennsylvania Law School
ROBERT KURZBAN, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Psychology
OWEN D. JONES, Vanderbilt University - School of Law & Department of Biological Sciences
Professors Donald Braman, Dan Kahan, and David Hoffman, in their article "Some Realism About Punishment Naturalism," to be published in an upcoming issue of the University of Chicago Law Review, critique a series of our articles: Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice (http://ssrn.com/abstract=932067), The Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice (http://ssrn.com/abstract=952726), and Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal Law and Justice Policy (http://ssrn.com/abstract=976026). Our reply, here, follows their article in that coming issue.
As we demonstrate, they have misunderstood our views on, and thus the implications of, widespread agreement about punishing the "core" of wrongdoing. Although much of their attack is therefore misplaced, important disagreements may remain concerning: whether there is a meaningful difference between core and non-core cases; whether judgments about core cases are less malleable than judgments about non-core cases; and whether imposing punishments perceived to be unjust imposes, in turn, significant costs on the criminal justice system. Which of the disputed views is correct can have important implications for the administration of criminal justice. Far from being anti-reformists, as accused, we argue that Reform Realism is the most effective path to bringing about needed reforms.
Posted by Adam Kolber on 04/24/2010 at 04:43 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)
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Posted by Adam Kolber on 04/23/2010 at 04:42 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)
Recently posted to SSRN:
"The Criminal Liability of Artificial Intelligence Entities"
GABRIEL HALLEVY, Ono Academic College, Faculty of Law
In 1981, a 37-year-old Japanese employee of a motorcycle factory was killed by an artificial-intelligence robot working near him. The robot erroneously identified the employee as a threat to its mission, and calculated that the most efficient way to eliminate this threat was by pushing him into an adjacent operating machine. Using its very powerful hydraulic arm, the robot smashed the surprised worker into the operating machine, killing him instantly, and then resumed its duties with no one to interfere with its mission. Unfortunately, this is not science fiction, and the legal question is: Who is to be held liable for this killing?
Posted by Adam Kolber on 04/20/2010 at 07:38 AM | Permalink | Comments (1)
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Posted by Adam Kolber on 04/18/2010 at 10:40 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)
Felicity Grisham is a recent Stanford graduate (who focused on neuropsychology) and will soon head off to law school. She has some thoughts on law and neuroscience (that overlap with mine in certain respects). Here is her post, entitled "The Problem of the Continuum," after the jump.
Continue reading "Felicity Grisham on "The Problem of the Continuum"" »
Posted by Adam Kolber on 04/17/2010 at 02:47 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)
Less than three months ago, I was quoted in the New York Times about the possibility of having fractional biological parents. Research in non-human primates showed how it was possible to create a child with genetic material from one father and two mothers. While splitting up "legal" parenthood into many parts is nothing new, having more than two genetic parents (what I call "fractional parents") is.
And now, it appears, researchers have created a human embryo with three genetic parents (chromosomal DNA from one father, chromosomal DNA from one mother, and mitochondrial DNA from a different mother). Assuming the embryo could be brought to term, the approach could enable women with damaged mitochondrial DNA to still become (fractional) biological parents. To be sure, the third parent's mitochondrial DNA would have just a tiny role in the child's total genetic profile. But biological parenthood could become even more diffuse in the future. Such developments raise interesting moral and legal questions about the nature of parenthood that I discuss here.
Posted by Adam Kolber on 04/15/2010 at 12:19 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)
In February of 2009, the National Academy of Sciences released its much anticipated diagnosis and prescription for what ails the forensic science community. The Report confirmed the low but steady noise that had been building in the criminal justice system for at least a decade: that, with the exception of DNA evidence, much of what is presented as forensic science is not really science at all. Instead, a large segment of the high-tech pageantry seen on television and now expected and employed in court would fail to clear even the lowest hurdles of stringent scientific inquiry. Nonetheless, forensic evidence is often used to demonstrate the certainty of a person’s guilt by authoritatively “matching” evidence from the crime scene or victim to the suspect. The Report sounded the alarm as to the needs of the forensic science community, raised critical concerns, and even suggested a remedy by calling for the creation of an independent agency to regulate the field of forensic science. Moreover, it came at a time of “forensiphilia” – where forensic science is itself a celebrity that captivates and enchants audiences. One year after the Report caused ripples throughout scientific and legal circles, it seems as though, in some ways, the shock has passed, numbness has set in, and progress is idle. This article will examine the evolution of forensic science on television and in the courtroom. It will evaluate whether DNA is the reliable anomaly among the forensic science disciplines. Finally, along a similar vein to the Report’s resolution to strengthen forensic science, this article will call for a strengthening in legal education aimed at fostering both an understanding of the advances in science and a skepticism towards methods that inherently lack a solid foundation in science.
Posted by Adam Kolber on 04/15/2010 at 03:33 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)
Posted by Adam Kolber on 04/14/2010 at 04:05 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)
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Posted by Adam Kolber on 04/13/2010 at 06:37 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)
President Obama has announced his intent to nominate new members to his Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues (who will join the previously announced chair, Amy Gutmann). The members-to-be are:
Those of you in the legal academy will recognize Anita Allen at the University of Pennsylvania (who works on issues of privacy, surveillance, memory, and more) and Nita Farahany at Vanderbilt University (who works on neurolaw, neuroethics, behavioral genetics, and more and has been frequently mentioned on this blog). I send my congratulations to them both!
The commission has a good number of people who do neuroscience-related work. In addition, the commission's charter states: "In support of its mission, the Commission may examine issues linked to specific technologies, including but not limited to . . . the application of neuro and robotic sciences." So it will be interesting to see how its work develops. George W. Bush's President's Council on Bioethics paid a good bit of attention to neuroethics issues, and it seems like the Obama incarnation may do the same.
The phrase "Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues" is a mouthful. The initials "PCSBI" don't help much. Maybe someday, there will be a uniform name from President to President that will have a convenient shorthand. In the meantime, Summer Johnson suggests "pucks-bee," (though I might have gone with "picks-bee").
Posted by Adam Kolber on 04/11/2010 at 03:27 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)