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I tend to be sympathetic to your conclusion, but I'm not sure you've made the case for it on this evidence. Why would a proponent of moral anger admit that "if Batson et al.’s studies are replicated and extended appropriately, we will have to face the fact that anger, as a response to wrongs, is limited in scope to the self and cared-for others (not humanity)"? It seems that what they would say is, that if these studies are replicated, this shows a deficiency in moral education. People need to *learn* to feel anger in response to wrongs to others, no matter who they are. As I understand the studies from your description, it doesn't sound like they've shown that it's not possible for people to feel moral anger on behalf of those they do not know. They've merely shown that most people don't feel that sort of anger. But that's not a terribly surprising result, and it's surely compatible with the claim that moral anger would be a good thing for us to feel.

It is an interesting question what the things are that we can learn to feel anger about. There is no doubt a lot of flexibility. Perhaps we could learn to feel anger at all moral transgressions. I doubt it, but let us assume that we could. Would this really be a desirable result? First of all, most of us would be in a constant state of anger, unless we learn to turn a blind eye to things. Secondly, anger seems to have action tendencies that are not necessarily desirable, e.g. revenge, lashing out, retaliation, etc. Thirdly, I suspect once we are angry, we are much less able to see things clearly and more likely to think that the event is a terrible wrong that has been committed even if, in fact, it is not a wrong at all. It seems to me that there are plenty of reasons to, if not eliminate, then cut down on, anger.
In any case, for some people the result will be surprising since many assume that moral anger is a very real and frequently occurring phenomenon (Haidt, Sherman, etc.). It seems not to be (depending, of course, on quite how you delineate 'moral').

However, if Batson et al.’s studies are replicated and extended appropriately, we will have to face the fact that anger, as a response to wrongs, is limited in scope to the self and cared-for others (not humanity).

I'm a little puzzled as to why anyone would think this would be a problem for the view that anger is a moral emotion. Nothing has ever required that moral emotions cover every case. How does anger at the mistreatment of (say) one's daughter fail to be moral outrage merely because you do not experience the same anger at the mistreatment of anyone's daughter? That seems a non sequitur. In general people who are moral sentimentalists of any sort (whether they are talking about anger or any other emotion) do not tend to accept the idea that morality requires universalization; you can have a genuinely moral judgment, for instance, without recognizing that this applies to more than the particular case at hand, and moral sentimentalists hold you can have moral sentiments -- anger, or pity, or what have you, even if you only feel that moral sentiment with regard to things closely connected to you.

Further, most people I've ever read who regard anger as a moral emotion do not think that the role of anger in moral life is limited merely to the anger itself; rather, it also serves as an anchor-point for (relatively unemotional) moral reasoning. For instance, I might not get angry at the torture of x, but recognize that x's anger at being tortured is righteous outrage; I don't have to be angry to recognize anger as having moral force. Likewise, I might reason from my own moral outrage at someone's mistreatment to the claim that, if anyone else is mistreated in that way, I should stand up for them in the same way. Or someone might convince me to stand up for someone by pointing out my own moral outrage in a particular case and noting that someone else could have the same type of moral outrage in this new case. These don't require always feeling angry about every case like the one that made me angry (which would likely be exhausting, in any case, as you note in the comment). If there are moral sentiments of any sort, there are lots of different ways in which they can contribute to moral life; you don't have to assume that they are the only features of moral life, which is what this sort of argument at least seems to suggest. And I've never come across anyone who did assume that.

And what about those evolutionary perspectives on our moral apparatus which say that vengance (and its emotional spur: anger) lies on the roots of our inherited sense of justice.

This is Jared Diamond´s view on the issue:

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