"The Actor–Observer Bias and Moral Intuitions"

The Actor–Observer Bias and Moral Intuitions: Adding Fuel to Sinnott-Armstrong’s Fire  is now available for free download in the current issue of Neuroethics:

Thomas Nadelhoffer¹ and Adam Feltz¹

(1)	Philosophy, Dickinson College, 201 East College, Carlisle, PA 17013, USA

Abstract:  In a series of recent papers, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has used findings in social psychology to put pressure on the claim that our moral beliefs can be non-inferentially justified. More specifically, he has suggested that insofar as our moral intuitions are subject to what psychologists call framing effects, this poses a real problem for moral intuitionism. In this paper, we are going to try to add more fuel to the empirical fire that Sinnott-Armstrong has placed under the feet of the intuitionist. Along the way, we first provide an overview of what Sinnott-Armstrong calls the Master Argument against intuitionism. Then we examine some of the literature on framing effects—especially as it pertains to moral philosophy. Finally, we present the results of a new study which create yet another hurdle intuitionists must clear if they want to motivate their view. It appears that in addition to being influenced by framing effects, our moral intuitions are also influenced by an actor–observer bias as well—a bias whereby we hold other people to different moral standards than we would hold ourselves even if we were in the same situation. If we’re right, the burden is on the moral intuitionist to explain why we should have faith in our moral intuitions despite the gathering evidence concerning their seeming unreliability. And by our lights, this is something that simply cannot be done from the armchair.

Comments

[Anibal]

Wow! a truly brilliant piece in experimental philosophy.

Well argumented and designed, and with a very cogent explanation of the results observed.

But, why a small group of participants, 25%, who thought it was less permisible to hit the swicth are considered as a category and then reconstructed as to be affected by an "affect-driven bias" that suposedely disconfirm moral intuitionism.

Why intuitions, in my reading emotional reactions to events, have to be considered as distortions of objectivity (Damasio´s work recognize the important role of emotions in decision-making, even in the moral domain)

Lets go to imagine that we agree that they are comanded by negative affect about the fate of the lonely worker in the side track, and that this affect, or passion, is what impell them to view the case as les permissible (e.g. guilty)

I believe, demonstrating an actor-observer asymetry, is not a case against moral intuitionism.

Only demosntrates the different psychological mechanisms involve in percieving ones own behaviour and other´s behaviour. Is this unreability. No. Because you and me, we, share the same "intuition apparatus" and when we reverse the perspective, always comes first the intuition.

The primary, or our first resort, is intuitionistic (sentimentally driven, or at least, non-cognitive mediated, and therefore even Sinnot-Armstrong´s skeptical argument against moral intuitions is nost right. Pace Professor Sinnot-Armastrong).

The real finding is, why in some minority of people´s responses is not express and display the appropiate intensity of affect (the guilty feeling more intense when is personal than when is impersonal which block correct moral cognition and judgment), and why we see ourselves differently than others (see, Emily Pronin´s work).

Nevertheless, i share with the authors, the intuitionist cannot defend himself from the armchair (or at least completely)so they can ghatering data and put the ultimate and definitive hurdle, though, i think this is not.