Neuroethics 1:1 Farah

Martha Farah is an important cognitive neuroscientist, well known for her work on visision. She is also one of the three or four leading neuroethicists. Her paper explores the ways in which neuroscience can help us with regard to a traditional philosophical topic, the problem of other minds (the problem of inferring whether other people have minds at all). As she says, this is an important ethical issue, because having conscious states is a necessary condition of certain kinds of moral status. The problem of neuroimaging consciousness is, I predict, likely to be very contentious in the near future, as more Schiavo-like cases arise, and Farah's paper is essential reading if we want to be able to come to informed views on these cases. PDF  HTML

Comments

[Patrick S. O'Donnell]

As I was growing up and developing self-awareness and self-knowledge, I don't recall having any difficulty whatsoever inferring (if indeed it was an inference) that those closest to me, and then those not so close to me, had minds. This is, I suspect, one of those "pseudo-problems" one finds now and again in philosophy and thus keeps professional philosophers busy in the ivory tower so as to preclude them from even the attempt at applying their facility with reason to the myriad ills that afflict the members of society who support their intellectual parlor games.

[Neil]

The philosophical problem (for all but a few sceptics) is not whether other people have other minds, but how we know that this is so. In any case, the problem Farah addresses - whether animals and those in comas or apparently vegetative are conscious - is very real and pressing.

[Patrick S. O'Donnell]

My point is not that it is not a metaphysical problem, but that it (i.e., 'the difficulty of knowing whether someone or something, other than oneself, has a mind') is NOT an epistemological problem as there are many beliefs (that have the presumptive status of knowledge) we are entitled to unless there are compelling reasons to doubt their veracity. On this kind of "default and challenge" model or "presumptive knowledge" see the work of Michael Williams and Nicholas Rescher respectively (also, some recent stuff by Alvin Goldman). I happen to think the problem she is addressing is a bit less pressing even if no less real, especially if we do not rely on the criteria of "consciousness" (philosophers notoriously do not agree on what that consciousness is, and I doubt neuroscience will settle *this* philosophical problem) as the sole or principal manner whereby we determine the nature of our ethical obligations. Leaving that aside, I'm still interested in carefully reading her article.

[Daniel Goldberg]

Patrick,

Bearing in mind that you and I have some pretty marked differences on the significance of skepticism, I'm not sure I understand the basis for your claim that the problem of other minds is not an epistemological problem. How could it be otherwise? The question is the basis for our knowledge that there are other minds.

There are all sorts of responses to the epistemic challenge posed by the skeptic, but I'm not sure I understand the claim that the challenge itself is not epistemic in nature. The mere fact that we can have justified belief -- a claim with which I entirely agree -- does not demonstrate to me that the problem with other minds is somehow exempted from epistemic concern; unless, of course, one was willing to give up entirely on the possibility of knowledge and simply focus on whether beliefs are justified. But I doubt you have this in mind.

[Patrick S. O'Donnell]

I simply meant that it is not an epistemological problem in the robust sense that what counts as knowledge are "justified true beliefs," and epistemology is primarily (thought to be) about THAT. I don't think it is a problem in that traditional sense, but certainly we can talk about it in the context of epistemology, like Williams and Rescher above, the point simply being that we are entitled to some beliefs, like the belief that others have minds like mine, without going through a (conventionally understood) process of epistemic justification, and hence we need not "justify" such a belief unless those who are motivated to challenge it can provide us with compelling or overwhelming evidence (i.e. reasons) as to why our beliefs are lacking adequate epistemic justification. It places the burden of proof on those who would deny or challenge the presumptive belief. In other words, "being justified is not always a matter of having gone through a prior process of justification," although we might say there is a "presumptive justification" for such a belief (it is, so to speak, innocent until proven guilty, unlike the traditional manner of discussing the question, which assumes one cannot innocently lay claim to such a belief without having oneself gone through a process of justification). So while there COULD be a "problem" of other minds, I don't think there in fact is. That there are other minds, like mine, is presumptively true until undermined by arguments or substantial evidence to the contrary. The presumption serves as the most plausible of rival alternatives ('I propose to accept it as true as insofar as no difficulties arise from doing so.'--Imagine saying this while holding the converse supposition, namely, that I only have knowledge of my mind: it would seem this raises some insuperable difficulties....). We cannot even conduct the cognitive enterprise itself without conceding that we know (and act on the knowledge) that other people, too, have minds.

[Daniel Goldberg]

So, if I am understanding you correctly, your claim is not really categorical in nature, i.e., that the problem of other minds is a metaphysical but not an epistemological problem. Rather, your claim seems to be that the epistemic challenge is not significant. If so, as you can probably guess, I disagree, as this is the point upon which I mentioned that we markedly disagree. The problems posed by skeptical challenges are extremely significant, IMO.

But, I'm quite certain neither of us is going to convince the other in a comment thread. Perhaps we can agree that the significance of the article depends upon one's perspective about the significance of the problem of other minds. Farah does say that the problem of "other minds" comes up quite literally in situations with minimally conscious patients.

[Patrick S. O'Donnell]

I have no intention of being snarky or patronizing when I implore you to please read carefully what I wrote: [I'm entitled to the belief] "That there are other minds, like mine, [and this] is presumptively true until undermined by arguments or substantial evidence [this would allow this to be an empirical quesion, which is eminently arguable: see below] to the contrary." Nothing I said precludes or disallows Farah from making her argument that in this or that case, we might doubt whether this person "has" a mind (the mind not being a thing). And should that turn out to be true, nothing about these cases (inasmuch as they amount to exceptions to the rule) undermines the presumptively held belief that I know others, like me, have minds. The burden of proof appropriately rests with those like Farah who aim to show us that there are or may be cases in which my belief is in fact not true. The "problem" in such cases is specific and localized and not a general one that undermines the holding of the presumptive belief that entitles one to attribute minds to other persons. And so I think this has nothing whatsoever to do with skepticism, radical or otherwise. And so I also don't think that "the significance of the article depends upon one's perspective about the significance of the problem of other minds." The article may be significant (I've yet to read it in full) even if I think the traditional epistemological (and solipsistic) question or "problem of other minds" is not a significant one or is a pseudo-problem. Exceptions to the rule neither disprove nor undermine the rule. What holds in my case and in most other cases may not hold in this or that case. At the same time, I think it is in fact a "conceptual question how the concepts of a mind and of a person's body are related to the concept of a person. We say that a person *has* a mind and *has* a body. Are there three different entities here--a person, a mind, and a body? Or two--a mind and a body? Or only one--a person? What is it to *have* a body? Might a person cease to have a body, but retain his mind? Or vice versa? These are not scientific questions, and are not soluble by scientific means."

[Anibal]

The recursive embededness of intentions (mental states) and actions lead to the fact that the very same intention can cause mamny disparate actions ,and viceversa, that one action can be caused by many different intentions.

When i read Anita Avramides´book "Other Minds" for the first time, i met with the perspectives and thoughts of many philosophers about the problem of other minds and the classical argument, called, the argument from analogy use by Mill and Hume to infer mental life in other beings, even nonhuman animals.

It is true that the argument form analogy it can be flawless: from the fact that others have bodies too, and body its a prerequisite of my feelings and i know that my feellings are an antecedent of my actions... it´s true.. we cannot predict with confidence that others have the same mental life like me, the same epistemic content (intention, belief, desire...)

My view, is that Farah´s wisdom conflates the classical philosophical problem of other minds that in actual terms it is express in primatology, developmental psychology and philosophy of mind with the question of how we can know the mental states of others, say, their intentions, beliefs and other epistemic states (see the dispute between Tomassello´s group and Povinelli´s goup), with the problem of wether others have conscious mental states.

To me it is not the same problem how we can know the mind of others, their epistemic states (mindreading, theory of mind...) and the problem of wether others have conscious mental states (conciousness studies).

Consciousness precedes complex cognition, and the problem of other minds orbit aound the phenomenon of complex cognition.

Consciouness its a first-order phenomenon and the other mind problem its a second-order phenomenon related to the the issue of how we represent either the behaviour or the mental states of others.

[Daniel Goldberg]

Patrick,

Thanks for the explanation. I really wasn't trying to be snarky; I genuinely did not understand your point.

"The burden of proof appropriately rests with those like Farah who aim to show us that there are or may be cases in which my belief is in fact not true. The "problem" in such cases is specific and localized and not a general one that undermines the holding of the presumptive belief that entitles one to attribute minds to other persons. And so I think this has nothing whatsoever to do with skepticism, radical or otherwise."

Sure, as long as one thinks that issues of justified belief do not depend on the state of our knowledge. If we are justified in believing in the existence of other minds even if we do not know that other minds exist, then skeptical challenges may leave much of the problem untouched. This is partly why I find thinking about justification and belief a much richer vein than thinking about knowledge, claims to which I find to be fundamentally derailed by all manner of skeptical challenges and paradoxes. If, on the other hand, one believes that we cannot justify our belief in other minds absent claims to know of the existence of other minds, then it seems to me that the problem has everything to do with skepticism, radical or otherwise.

I admit to still being confused as to exactly how the problem of other minds is a metaphysical but not an epistemological problem, and respectfully, I don't think the position you've elucidated thus far makes this distinction clear. I cannot see any way in which the problem of other minds is anything but an epistemological problem. We could potentially sidestep the problem in any one of a number of ways, but doing so would not, in my view, mean that the problem as such is not an epistemological problem.

[Patrick S. O'Donnell]

Daniel,

I did not think you were being snarky: It was rather that I did not want to be read as such.

Re: "Sure, as long as one thinks that issues of justified belief do not depend on the state of our knowledge." I don't see how this follows from something I said. Now it's my turn to be confused.

My point above was that *I* was not dealing with this topic as a metaphysical one, which one could of course; in fact, I was explaining how I saw the epistemological issues: my approach made the (metaphysical) assumption that other such minds exist. And I do believe that this and other epistemological questions do make significant and interesting metaphysical assumptions, none of which I was discussing.

I think "thinking about justification and belief" implicates one in thinking about what counts or waht does not count as knowledge, or else one can't make heads or tails of the arguments of skepticism.

"I admit to still being confused as to exactly how the problem of other minds is a metaphysical but not an epistemological problem,"--well, the confusion doesn't start with me, because, again, this is not what I said, not a claim I made. I was only stating that it *could* be a metaphysical problem but that I was, instead, interested in the question of why (and how) one is entitled to some beliefs (like the belief that others have minds and) without having, in the first instance, to "justify" them.

Let me put my point another way than that above because I've yet to see my point expressed or summarized (or appreciated: i.e., I can't recognize my account in your characterizations) in the manner in which I put it: You cannot claim to know that *you* have a mind without simulataneously making (by implication) the claim that others have minds as well. This argument can be made several ways and I have neither the time nor energy nor desire to make it in full here but I'll give you one recent example, that readers of this blog should find intriguing. In The Paradox of Self-Consciousness (1998), Jose Luis Bermudez explores The Symmetry Thesis, namely, that "A subject's psychological self-awareness is constitutively linked to his awareness of other minds." There are two versions of the Thesis that he discusses, endorsing one of them: "there are some psychological cateogories that a subject cannot apply to himself without also being able to apply them to other psychological subjects. These psychological categories form the core notion of a psychological subject. This is so because a subject's recognition that he is distinct from the environment in virtue of being a psychological subject depends on his ability to identify himself as a psychological subject within a contrast space with other psychological subjects, and this self-identification as a psychological subject takes place relative to a set of categories that collectively define the core of the concept of a psychological concept." [Bermudez relies on a treatment of different forms of *non-conceptual* self-consciousness "that are both logically and ontogenetically more primitive than the higher forms of self-consciousness that are more usually the focus of philosophical debate."]

Here, the epistemological "problem" of "other minds" is no longer a live one in any urgent sense insofar as one can be said to possess the aforementioned minimal form of self-knowledge or awareness. One does not, one need not, and one should not *begin*, in other words, within a solipsistic epistemological framework or with solipsistic epistemic assumptions. Insofar as one has knowledge of one's own mind, that knowledge is predicated upon the simultaneous presence/knowledge of "other minds," in this case owing to an account of psychological development. (This is in the spirit of my very first post, but I should point out that Bermudez makes clear that this is not established in an inferential manner.)

Thus there are epistemological (perhaps, as with Bermudez, cum psychological) approaches to philosophy of mind questions that do NOT refer "to the difficulty of knowing whether someone or something, other than oneself, has a mind."

I hope you'll allow this to be *my* last words on the topic in this thread, although we might, in the future and elsewhere, continue this discussion.