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The recursive embededness of intentions (mental states) and actions lead to the fact that the very same intention can cause mamny disparate actions ,and viceversa, that one action can be caused by many different intentions.

When i read Anita Avramides´book "Other Minds" for the first time, i met with the perspectives and thoughts of many philosophers about the problem of other minds and the classical argument, called, the argument from analogy use by Mill and Hume to infer mental life in other beings, even nonhuman animals.

It is true that the argument form analogy it can be flawless: from the fact that others have bodies too, and body its a prerequisite of my feelings and i know that my feellings are an antecedent of my actions... it´s true.. we cannot predict with confidence that others have the same mental life like me, the same epistemic content (intention, belief, desire...)

My view, is that Farah´s wisdom conflates the classical philosophical problem of other minds that in actual terms it is express in primatology, developmental psychology and philosophy of mind with the question of how we can know the mental states of others, say, their intentions, beliefs and other epistemic states (see the dispute between Tomassello´s group and Povinelli´s goup), with the problem of wether others have conscious mental states.

To me it is not the same problem how we can know the mind of others, their epistemic states (mindreading, theory of mind...) and the problem of wether others have conscious mental states (conciousness studies).

Consciousness precedes complex cognition, and the problem of other minds orbit aound the phenomenon of complex cognition.

Consciouness its a first-order phenomenon and the other mind problem its a second-order phenomenon related to the the issue of how we represent either the behaviour or the mental states of others.

The recursive embededness of intentions (mental states) and actions lead to the fact that the very same intention can cause mamny disparate actions ,and viceversa, that one action can be caused by many different intentions.

When i read Anita Avramides´book "Other Minds" for the first time, i met with the perspectives and thoughts of many philosophers about the problem of other minds and the classical argument, called, the argument from analogy use by Mill and Hume to infer mental life in other beings, even nonhuman animals.

It is true that the argument form analogy it can be flawless: from the fact that others have bodies too, and body its a prerequisite of my feelings and i know that my feellings are an antecedent of my actions... it´s true.. we cannot predict with confidence that others have the same mental life like me, the same epistemic content (intention, belief, desire...)

My view, is that Farah´s wisdom conflates the classical philosophical problem of other minds that in actual terms it is express in primatology, developmental psychology and philosophy of mind with the question of how we can know the mental states of others, say, their intentions, beliefs and other epistemic states (see the dispute between Tomassello´s group and Povinelli´s goup), with the problem of wether others have conscious mental states.

To me it is not the same problem how we can know the mind of others, their epistemic states (mindreading, theory of mind...) and the problem of wether others have conscious mental states (conciousness studies).

Consciousness precedes complex cognition, and the problem of other minds orbit aound the phenomenon of complex cognition.

Consciouness its a first-order phenomenon and the other mind problem its a second-order phenomenon related to the the issue of how we represent either the behaviour or the mental states of others.

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