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Posted by Adam Kolber on 12/29/2009 at 10:51 AM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
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Posted by Adam Kolber on 12/20/2009 at 10:36 AM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
The Ethics of Limb Amputation and Locus of Disease, by Ronald Pies, was recently published in Neuroethics. The abstract is below. You should also check out Christopher Ryan's reply here:
| (1) | Department Bioethics and Humanities, SUNY Upstate Medical University, Syracuse, NY 13210, USA |
| (2) | Clinical Professor of Psychiatry, Tufts University School of Medicine, Boston, MA 02111, USA |
| (3) | Present address: Box 332, Bedford, MA 01730, USA |
Abstract: The ethics of medically-authorized limb amputation in individuals with Body integrity identity disorder (BIID) remains extremely controversial. One factor to consider is the putative locus of a disease process, and whether the proposed treatment--in this case, limb amputation—reasonably addresses the issue of what organ is mediating the patient’s complaint.
Posted by Adam Kolber on 12/17/2009 at 03:00 AM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Former guest blogger Peter Reiner writes here about recent research (making headlines all over the place) showing how extinction training can be particularly effective when done soon after a disturbing experience.
Peter notes that extinction training is a behavioral technique to address upsetting memories rather than a pharmaceutical technique. Here's how he concludes:
But the interesting question from the perspective of neuroethics is this: does it really make the process of therapeutic forgetting any less worrisome when the manipulation is behavioural rather than pharmacological? I would suggest that many people would say yes. Certainly the issue of safety is sidestepped, but I suspect that this is not the essence of most people’s concerns. Rather, I believe that we have an aversion to using chemicals to manipulate our brains (except for hedonist pursuits that fall under the umbrella of recreational drug use) while we seem rather comfortable with manipulating our brains by behavioural measures. One plausible hypothesis is that the behavioral manipulation somehow seems more natural to us. But as any keen observer of neuroscience knows (and indeed, as the reconsolidation hypothesis demonstrates), every experience that we have changes the underlying chemical makeup of our brains. So is it so different after all?
I suspect Peter is right about the following two claims that I think are implicit in his analysis: (1) people tend to recognize big differences in the appropriate uses of behavioral interventions and pharmaceutical interventions and (2) on careful examination, one would be hard pressed to justify such differences.
Posted by Adam Kolber on 12/15/2009 at 02:37 AM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Recent scientific findings about the developing teen brain have both captured public attention and begun to percolate through legal theory and practice. Indeed, many believe that developmental neuroscience contributed to the U.S. Supreme Court’s elimination of the juvenile death penalty in Roper v. Simmons. Post-Roper, scholars assert that the developmentally normal attributes of the teen brain counsel differential treatment of young offenders, and advocates increasingly make such arguments before the courts. The success of any theory, though, depends in large part on implementation, and challenges that emerge through implementation illuminate problematic aspects of the theory. This Article tests the legal impact of developmental neuroscience by analyzing cases in which juvenile defendants have attempted to put it into practice. It reveals that most such efforts fail. Doctrinal factors hamstring most claims — for example, that persons with immature brains are incapable of forming the requisite mens rea for serious crimes. Limitations intrinsic to the science itself — for example, individual variation — also hinder its relevance and impact. These factors both explain why developmental neuroscience has had minimal effects on juvenile justice in the courts and illustrate why it generally should. Moreover, direct reliance on neuroscience as the metric for juvenile justice policy may jeopardize equality and autonomy interests, and brain-based arguments too frequently risk inaccuracy and overstatement. The cases also strongly suggest that neuroscience does not materially shape legal decision-makers’ beliefs and values about youthful offenders but instead will be read through the lens of those beliefs and values.
Developmental neuroscience nonetheless can play a small role in juvenile justice going forward. Legislatures and courts may regard that science as one source among many upon which to draw when basing policy choices on assumptions about juveniles as a group. To go further is unwarranted and threatens to draw attention away from critical legal and environmental factors — good schools, strong families, economic opportunities, mental health care, humane sentencing regimes, and rehabilitative services — that are both more important and subject to greater direct control.
Posted by Adam Kolber on 12/15/2009 at 02:01 AM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
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Posted by Adam Kolber on 12/14/2009 at 03:01 AM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Sally Satel writes in Forbes about neuromarketing hype, particularly of the EEG variety. Here's how she concludes:
Having raised an impressive $9 million, the least one can safely say about EmSense is that it surely knows how to market itself. But whether EmSense, or other neuromarketers for that matter, can deliver on their high-tech promises remains to be seen.
You can read the full article here.
Posted by Adam Kolber on 12/14/2009 at 02:26 AM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
A student group dedicated to law and neuroscience has launched at the University of Pennsylvania and the group is reaching out to other law students as well. Martha Farah writes in with some details:
The Law and Brain Student Group was started by Penn Law second-year student Ben Bumann, who has already engaged several of his fellow students at Penn and is now reaching out to interested students at other law schools.
There are many projects, centers and conferences on law and the brain, but these are aimed primarily at professionals -- legal scholars, lawyers and judges. It's surprising that none of these programs have made a concerted effort to engage students because, from what I've seen, there is a huge amount of interest in neuroscience among law students. So I'm delighted that Ben has taken up this challenge!
So far the Law and Brain Student Group has planned a series of monthly talks, to take place at Penn in the spring semester of 2010. We'll kick the semester off with a talk by Hank Greely of Stanford Law School on January 14th, followed by a reception where students can chat with the speaker and each other. Law students from outside of Penn are welcome to attend (but please RSVP to lawgroup@neuroethics.upenn.edu). See our website for more details: http://www.neuroethics.upenn.edu/.
Posted by Adam Kolber on 12/09/2009 at 03:04 PM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Some recent research arguably finds a relationship between toddlers' fear reactions and their propensity to commit crimes as adults. The research suggests that toddlers with weaker fear reactions to a noisy blare are more likely to grow up and commit crimes than toddlers with more typical fear reactions. New Scientist summarizes the experiment:
. . . Raine and colleague Yu Gao turned to data from a 1970s study, collected as part of a decades-long project to understand the biological and environmental factors underlying mental illness.
Back then, researchers led by Raine's former research supervisor had measured the sweat response of about 1800 3-year-olds in Mauritius when they were exposed to two different sounds. One sound was always followed by a noisy blare, the other by nothing. The children learned to anticipate which sound preceded the blare, and sweated in response to it – an indicator of fear.
Decades later, Raine's own team looked to see if any of the subjects had criminal records and found 137 that did. The team discovered that, as toddlers, these people had sweated significantly less in anticipation of the blare compared with subjects of similar race, gender and background for whom no criminal record was found.
This very interesting research is, of course, quite preliminary. The article cautions as follows:
However, numerous children who showed muted responses to fearful cues never fell foul of the law, Raine says. "Is this a throw-away-the-key approach to criminals? Absolutely not," he says.
Raine emphasises that environment can make someone less likely to commit a crime. He points to other studies from his team, also based on data from Mauritius, which indicate that manipulating a child's surroundings with improved nutrition, more exercise and cognitive stimulation, can reduce the chance they will commit a crime later on in life.
(X-posted to CrimProf Blog)
Posted by Adam Kolber on 12/09/2009 at 02:15 AM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
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Posted by Adam Kolber on 12/07/2009 at 05:47 AM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Autonomy and Coercion in Academic “Cognitive Enhancement” Using Methylphenidate: Perspectives of Key Stakeholders was published in the most recent issue of our partner journal, Neuroethics:
Cynthia Forlini1, 2 and Eric Racine3, 4, 5, 6
| (1) | Neuroethics Research Unit, Institut de recherches cliniques de Montréal, Montreal, QC, Canada |
| (2) | Programmes de bioéthique, Université de Montréal, Montreal, QC, Canada |
| (3) | Director, Neuroethics Research Unit, Institut de recherches cliniques de Montréal, Montreal, QC, Canada |
| (4) | Department of Medicine and Department of Social and Preventive Medicine, Université de Montréal, Montreal, QC, Canada |
| (5) | Department of Neurology and Neurosurgery & Biomedical Ethics Unit, McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada |
| (6) | 110, Avenue des Pins O., Montréal, QC, H2W 1R7, Canada |
Abstract: There is mounting evidence that methylphenidate (MPH; Ritalin) is being used by healthy college students to improve concentration, alertness, and academic performance. One of the key concerns associated with such use of pharmaceuticals is the degree of freedom individuals have to engage in or abstain from cognitive enhancement (CE). From a pragmatic perspective, careful examination of the ethics of acts and contexts in which they arise includes considering coercion and social pressures to enhance cognition. We were interested in understanding how university students, parents of university students, and healthcare providers viewed autonomy and coercion in CE using MPH. We found that perspectives converged on the belief that CE is a matter of personal and individual choice. Perspectives also converged on the existence of tremendous social pressures to perform and succeed. Parents emphasized personal responsibility and accountability for CE choices, and expressed feelings of worry, sadness and fear about CE. Students emphasized the importance of personal integrity in CE, expressed tolerance for personal choices of others, and highlighted the challenge that CE poses to maintaining one’s personal integrity. Healthcare providers emphasized the health consequences of CE. These results illustrate: (1) the importance of understanding how context is viewed in relation to perspectives on autonomous choice; (2) the limitations of individualistic libertarian approaches that do not consider social context; and (3) the ethical implications of public health interventions in a value-laden debate where perspectives diverge.
Posted by Adam Kolber on 12/06/2009 at 03:58 AM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
‘Cosmetic Neurology’ and the Moral Complicity Argument has been published in the most recent issue of our partner journal, Neuroethics:
A. Ravelingien1 , J. Braeckman1, L. Crevits2, D. De Ridder3 and E. Mortier4
| (1) | Department of Philosophy, Bioethics Institute Ghent, Ghent University, Blandijnberg 2, 9000 Gent, Belgium |
| (2) | Department of Neurology, Ghent University Hospital, De Pintelaan 185, 9000 Gent, Belgium |
| (3) | BRAI2N & Department of Neurosurgery, University of Antwerp Hospital, Wilrijkstraat 10, 2650 Edegem, Belgium |
| (4) | Department of Anaesthesiology, Ghent University Hospital, De Pintelaan 185, 9000 Gent, Belgium |
Abstract: Over the past decades, mood enhancement effects of various drugs and neuromodulation technologies have been proclaimed. If one day highly effective methods for significantly altering and elevating one’s mood are available, it is conceivable that the demand for them will be considerable. One urgent concern will then be what role physicians should play in providing such services. The concern can be extended from literature on controversial demands for aesthetic surgery. According to Margaret Little, physicians should be aware that certain aesthetic enhancement requests reflect immoral social norms and ideals. By granting such requests, she argues, doctors render themselves complicit to a collective ‘evil’. In this paper, we wish to question the extent to which physicians, psychiatrists and/or neurosurgeons should play a role as ‘moral gatekeepers’ in dealing with suspect demands and norms underlying potential desires to alter one’s mood or character. We investigate and discuss the nature and limits of physician responsibilities in reference to various hypothetical and intuitively problematic mood enhancement requests.
Posted by Adam Kolber on 12/03/2009 at 10:57 AM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Brain to Computer Communication: Ethical Perspectives on Interaction Models was published in the latest issue of our partner journal Neuroethics. Here is the abstract and author information:
| (1) | Dipartimento di Scienze fisiche, Università di Napoli Federico II, Complesso Universitario Monte S. Angelo, Via Cintia, 80126 Napoli, Italy |
Abstract: Brain Computer Interfaces (BCIs) enable one to control peripheral ICT and robotic devices by processing brain activity on-line. The potential usefulness of BCI systems, initially demonstrated in rehabilitation medicine, is now being explored in education, entertainment, intensive workflow monitoring, security, and training. Ethical issues arising in connection with these investigations are triaged taking into account technological imminence and pervasiveness of BCI technologies. By focussing on imminent technological developments, ethical reflection is informatively grounded into realistic protocols of brain-to-computer communication. In particular, it is argued that human-machine adaptation and shared control distinctively shape autonomy and responsibility issues in current BCI interaction environments. Novel personhood issues are identified and analyzed too. These notably concern (i) the “sub-personal” use of human beings in BCI-enabled cooperative problem solving, and (ii) the pro-active protection of personal identity which BCI rehabilitation therapies may afford, in the light of so-called motor theories of thinking, for the benefit of patients affected by severe motor disabilities.
Posted by Adam Kolber on 12/03/2009 at 10:55 AM | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
