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I posted the papers here: http://cerebrii.com/?page_id=169 -

I'll keep them up for ~ 1 week so grab what you can.

Bless you, Rich.

"Lacking any sensorimotor or social presence of its own, the brain by itself cannot "underlie" selfhood, but only as part of the whole living human being. If the minded individual is embodied, this must mean more than being embrained."

Forgive me for objecting after only having read Prof. Burwood's abstract, but it seems like the author has its work cut out for him if he wants to show that "the brain by itself cannot underlie selfhood."

The claim doesn't seem to follow from his claim that the "brain [lacks] any sensorimotor or social presence of its own," no matter what that means.

More importantly, even if he does end up giving a plausible account of what that means, the claim "the brain lacks...[a] presence of its own" is to assume the proposition he is trying to prove (that we are not our brains.)

Thomas,

Those seem like legitimate criticisms to me, but, as I have not yet read the paper, I am not in any position to see how Burwood accounts for such objections.

I'll try to add an update after I read it.

(For the record, I am happy to concede that the brain "underlies" selfhood; my brief is with those who insist that selfhood is nothing but the brain).

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