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« April 2008 | Main | June 2008 »

Kahan on Cultural Cognition

Dan Kahan (Yale, Law) has posted "Cultural Cognition as a Conception of the Cultural Theory of Risk" to SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

Cultural cognition refers to the tendency of individuals to form beliefs about societal dangers that reflect and reinforce their commitments to particular visions of the ideal society. Cultural cognition is one of a variety of approaches designed to empirically test the cultural theory of risk associated with Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky. This commentary discusses the distinctive features of cultural cognition as a conception of cultural theory, including its cultural worldview measures; its emphasis on social psychological mechanisms that connect individuals' risk perceptions to their cultural outlooks; and its practical goal of enabling self-conscious management of popular risk perceptions in the interest of promoting scientifically sound public policies that are congenial to persons of diverse outlooks.

UPDATED: Uncontacted Tribes

UPDATE: Apparently, a photographer deliberately misled AP reporters in the story I've striked out below.  See here for more information.

A bit afield from the usual fare on this blog (though not wholly unrelated), I highly recommend this AP news article on Amazon tribes that have had little contact with the rest of the world. 

The article also says, "Survival International estimates about 100 tribes worldwide have chosen to avoid contact, but said the only truly uncontacted tribe is the Sentinelese, who live on North Sentinel island off the coast of India and shoot arrows at anyone who comes near."  The contents of this Wikipedia entry, however, would seem to conflict with the claim that the Sentinelese are "truly uncontacted."  In any event, the Wikipedia entry also makes for interesting reading.

Placebo Deception of Children

Today's New York Times has an article about a company that is marketing placebos, intended to be deceptively administered to children:

With the help of her husband, Dennis, she founded a placebo company, and, without a hint of irony, named it Efficacy Brands. Its chewable, cherry-flavored dextrose tablets, Obecalp, for placebo spelled backward, goes on sale on June 1 at the Efficacy Brands Web site. Bottles of 50 tablets will sell for $5.95. The Buettners have plans for a liquid version, too.

Because they contain no active drug, the pills will not be sold as a drug under Food and Drug Administration rules. They will be marketed as dietary supplements, meaning they can be sold at groceries, drugstores and discount stores without a prescription.

“This is designed to have the texture and taste of actual medicine so it will trick kids into thinking that they’re taking something,” Ms. Buettner said. “Then their brain takes over, and they say, ‘Oh, I feel better.’ ”

I don't know whether this is a good use of placebos or not.  The pills likely will make some kids feel better.  They may also increase their need for medical interventions, even when kids might be better off developing some tolerance for life's minor aches and pains.  The same is true, of course, for drugs like aspirin.  Clearly, there are costs and benefits of placebo deception.  I do believe that the issue can be studied scientifically and that we would be better off doing so than merely speculating about the effects of deceptive placebo administration.

In 2006, the American Medical Association amended its code of ethics to categorically prohibit doctors from deceptively administering placebos.  Thus, if a doctor were to give "Obecalp" to a patient, he or she would be violating the profession's code of ethics and would face increased risk of a malpractice lawsuit and of disciplinary sanctions.  Moreover, the doctor is likely violating the code simply by recommending to parents of their pediatric patients that they occasionally use Obecalp.  Doctors may even be violating the code of ethics when using Obecalp on their own child.  The AMA prohibition only applies to "substances" administered in order to obtain placebo effects, so you can still do the "kiss it and make it better" routine with kids.  But the difference between Obecalp and the "kiss it and make it better" routine is arguably not so big.

Do you think that placebo deception is rare? Not so much.  Here's what I wrote in an earlier blog post:

While many people are aware that placebos are openly used in double-blind medical experiments, far fewer know that doctors sometimes surreptitiously give patients placebos in hospitals and medical offices.  Doctors may use pure placebos, like sugar pills and saline injections, as well as so-called impure placebos, conventional medications used in situations just to generate a placebo effect (e.g., antibiotics to treat viral infections or multivitamins to treat conditions that do not involve vitamin deficiencies).  So if a doctor prescribes an antidepressant just to generate a placebo effect, then the doctor has prescribed an impure placebo.

A recent survey of faculty physicians at Chicago-area medical schools found that almost half had used a placebo of one form or another in clinical practice and almost all believed that placebos can be therapeutic.  Only 12% believed that placebos should be categorically prohibited. 

Again, I don't know if the AMA's prohibition is so bad in the specific context of children and Obecalp.  But, I do believe that the AMA's categorical prohibition of placebo deception is overinclusive, insensitive to patient preferences, and likely to have unforeseen consequences.  There are times when placebos can be used appropriately--even if deceptively.  I discuss the issue in more detail in this article, recently published in the Yale Law & Policy Review.

"Evidence and Law Conference" at Dartmouth

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong sends new of an upcoming conference at Dartmouth (June 20-22).  Be sure to contact Meredyth Morley (Meredyth.Morley@Dartmouth.edu) soon if you're interested in attending.  Click here: Download law_evid_WSA_conf.pdf  for the full scoop on scheduling and content, including Walter's talk "Brain Scans as Legal Evidence."

Pinker on "The Stupidity of Dignity"

Steven Pinker discusses "The Stupidity of Dignity" in the New Republic.  Here's a sample:

Many people are vaguely disquieted by developments (real or imagined) that could alter minds and bodies in novel ways. Romantics and Greens tend to idealize the natural and demonize technology. Traditionalists and conservatives by temperament distrust radical change. Egalitarians worry about an arms race in enhancement techniques. And anyone is likely to have a "yuck" response when contemplating unprecedented manipulations of our biology. The President's Council has become a forum for the airing of this disquiet, and the concept of "dignity" a rubric for expounding on it. This collection of essays is the culmination of a long effort by the Council to place dignity at the center of bioethics. The general feeling is that, even if a new technology would improve life and health and decrease suffering and waste, it might have to be rejected, or even outlawed, if it affronted human dignity.

Whatever that is. The problem is that "dignity" is a squishy, subjective notion, hardly up to the heavyweight moral demands assigned to it. The bioethicist Ruth Macklin, who had been fed up with loose talk about dignity intended to squelch research and therapy, threw down the gauntlet in a 2003 editorial, "Dignity Is a Useless Concept." Macklin argued that bioethics has done just fine with the principle of personal autonomy--the idea that, because all humans have the same minimum capacity to suffer, prosper, reason, and choose, no human has the right to impinge on the life, body, or freedom of another. This is why informed consent serves as the bedrock of ethical research and practice, and it clearly rules out the kinds of abuses that led to the birth of bioethics in the first place, such as Mengele's sadistic pseudoexperiments in Nazi Germany and the withholding of treatment to indigent black patients in the infamous Tuskegee syphilis study. Once you recognize the principle of autonomy, Macklin argued, "dignity" adds nothing.

Goaded by Macklin's essay, the Council acknowledged the need to put dignity on a firmer conceptual foundation. This volume of 28 essays and commentaries by Council members and invited contributors is their deliverable, addressed directly to President Bush. The report does not, the editors admit, settle the question of what dignity is or how it should guide our policies. It does, however, reveal a great deal about the approach to bioethics represented by the Council. And what it reveals should alarm anyone concerned with American biomedicine and its promise to improve human welfare. For this government-sponsored bioethics does not want medical practice to maximize health and flourishing; it considers that quest to be a bad thing, not a good thing.

. . .

So, despite the best efforts of the contributors, the concept of dignity remains a mess. The reason, I think, is that dignity has three features that undermine any possibility of using it as a foundation for bioethics.

Pinker argues that dignity is relative and fungible and can be harmful.

"Nanotechnology and the Attribution of Responsibility"

Only an abstract is posted of the following article:

"Nanotechnology and the Attribution of Responsibility"

Nanotechnology, Law and Business, Forthcoming

KATRINA SIFFERD, Elmhurst College
To attribute responsibility, including criminal responsibility, one must use commonsense psychology. Commonsense psychology allows us to understand and predict behavior via attribution of mental states, and thus to asses the relationship between a person's desires and any harm they have caused. This article discusses how nanotechnological advances, particularly in neuroscience, may affect our commonsense attribution of mental states, and thus affect assessments of responsibility. Neuroscientific nanotechnology may have this effect by providing new information about the mental states relevant to responsibility, or by allowing us to alter, inhibit, or `implant' the mental states relevant to responsibility. I conclude that these possibilities of neuroscientific nanotechnology pose no unique threat to criminal responsibility except with regard to implantation of desires (the least likely possibility).

Hyperthymestic Syndrome

In my article on memory-dampening drugs, I discuss the case of "A.J." a woman with "hyperthymestic syndrome."  She has an incredible memory, particularly for autobiographical events in her life.  Here's a USA Today story about A.J., whose names is really Jill Price. (I guess when you hide the name of a research subject with initials the initials need not or perhaps should not bear a clear resemblance to the subject's actual initials!)

And here's another story of a man with hyperthymestic syndrome from CNN.

Pistorius and the Enhancement/Therapy Distinction

The NYT recently ran a story about Oscar Pistorius, discussed previously on this blog.  Here's are the opening two paragraphs:

When an international court ruled Friday that a double-amputee sprinter from South Africa was eligible to compete in this summer’s Olympic Games in Beijing, the stage was set for disabled athletes to meet their own trailblazer.

The watershed ruling made the runner, Oscar Pistorius, the first amputee to successfully challenge the notion that his carbon-fiber prosthetics gave him an unfair advantage and assured his right to race against able-bodied athletes in the Olympics, should he qualify. Previously barred from competing in such races by track and field’s world governing body, Pistorius will continue to stoke the debate over the competitive issues created by evolving technology in sports.

One aspect of the case that does not seem to get a lot of attention is the following: Scientists seem to be studying his body to see if he has an unfair advantage over able-bodied runners. (Incidentally, "able-bodied" is surely an odd way to put the distinction, considering just how able-bodied Pistorius is).  Underlying the analysis seems to be the view that the body mechanics of ordinary running should serve as the appropriate baseline.  In other words, people seem to focus on whether Pistorius would be in the Olympics were he able-bodied.  But it could be the case that his body is unusually well-suited to running with "Cheetah" prosthetics.  In fact, it could be that, were we all to have amputations at 11-months-old and then run with Cheetah prosthetics, Pistorius would be the best runner in the world.  Alternatively, he might just be extraordinarily good without quite being Olympics material. 

Given that the ideal body for Cheetah-running is probably different than the ideal body for traditional running, there is an interesting underlying question about what exactly we are trying to assess about Pistorius's running ability.  Right now, the analysis seems to be "Does he have an unfair advantage against people who are excellent "biological feet" runners?"  But one might instead ask, "Is he a top specimen among those who are excellent "cheetah prosthetic" runners?"  I suspect that the difference between these questions may not be huge in this context, but may very well be big in the context of other kinds of bodily enhancements we can imagine.

Neuroeconomics Conference

Dave Hoffman blogs here about a recent law and neuroeconomics conference: Law, Economics and Neuroscience Conference: Implications for Innovation.  Neat graphics, too, for a blog post.

The Men Who Stare At Goats

Here's an excerpt from a post at BoingBoing about a film that's been greenlighted and likely to have some modest influence on pop culture.  This sounds quite wacky, and many of the underlying claims are (admittedly?) dubious:

The Men Who Stare At Goats is a must-read 2005 book by UK journalist Jon Ronson about the US government's interest in very strange stuff, like Jedi powers, psychic spying, subliminal sound weapons, and the potential to kill something (like a goat, or an enemy soldier) just by looking at it. Fact or fiction, or most likely some of both, it's an absolute blast to read. (And Ronson's BBC documentary based on the book, Crazy Rulers of the World, is a lot of fun too! You can find it here on Google Video.) Yesterday, it was announced that Grant Heslov will direct a feature film based on The Men Who Stare At Goats.