Neuroethics & Law Blog

UCL's Law and Neuroscience Colloquium

I'm pleased to be participating in University College London's Law and Neuroscience Colloquium that runs from July 6-7, 2009.  As always, Neuroethics & Law Blog readers in attendance are encouraged to introduce themselves.  Here is a link to the event and here is the program:

DAY ONE: 6 July 2009
9.30	SESSION I:
	Neuroscience’s Challenge to Folk Psychology Implicit in Law Stephen Morse (University of Pennsylvania Law School) Social, Cultural and Explanatory Power That Scientific and Clinical Images Maintain in Western Culture Daniel Goldberg (Baylor College of Medicine) What Neuroscience Can (and Cannot) Tell Us About Criminal Responsibility Walter Glannon (University of Calgary)
11.30	SESSION II:
	Neuroscience and emotional distress claims in tort law Betsy Grey (Arizona State University School of Law) Reciprocity and Neuroscience in Public Health Law A.M. Viens (Queen Mary, University of London) The Neuroscience of Fair Play: Neural Mechanisms Underlying Altruistic Behaviours and Their Failures Donald Pfaff (Rockefeller University, New York) Brain Images As Legal Evidence Adina Roskies and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Dartmouth College)
13.15	LUNCH
14:15	SESSION III:
	The Illusion of Intentionality and Its Implications for Criminal Law Colin Blakemore (Nuffield Department of Clinical Sciences, Oxford University) Neurotechnology and Subjective Experience Adam Kolber  (University of San Diego) The Relevance of Neuroscience to the Law’s Responsibility Practices Nicole A Vincent (Delft University of Technology) The Brain Sciences and Criminal Law Norms Ted Blumoff (Mercer University)
16:00	BREAK
16:30	SESSION IVA:
	Science on Juvenile Justice Terry Maroney (Vanderbilt University Law School) The Teen Brain and Transition To Adulthood June Carbone (University of Missouri Law School) and Naomi Cahn (George Washington University) The Carmentis Machine: Legal and Ethical Issues in the Use of Neuro-imaging for Prognosis in Newborn Infants  Dominic Wilkinson (University of Oxford, Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics) and Charles Foster (The Ethox Centre, University of Oxford, and Outer Temple Chambers, London)
	SESSION IVB:
	Neurojurisprudence: The End of the Naturalistic Fallacy and The Beginning of Natural Reforms Morris Hoffman (Judge, Denver) In Quest of Fundamental Principles of ‘Neurolaw’ Federico Gustavo Pizzetti (University of Milano) Law and the Brain – A Perspective from The Netherlands Gert-Jan Lokhorst (Delft University of Technology)
18:00	DAY ONE ENDS
18:30	PUBLIC LECTURE The Objectivity of Subjective Truths Semir Zeki (UCL) Venue: Jeremy Bentham Room, UCL
19:30	RECEPTION
DAY TWO: 7 JULY 2009
09:00     SESSION V:
	Neuroscience and National Security: A Human Rights Critique  Jonathan Marks (Penn State University) Screen and Intervene: Biomarkers and the Search of Criminal Susceptibilities Nikolas Rose (London School of Economics) Incriminating Thoughts Nita Farahany (Vanderbilt University, Philosophy) Forensic Neuroscience and the Right To Silence Dov Fox (Yale University)
11:15	BREAK
11:30	SESSION VI:
	Moral Responsibility and The Problem of Luck John Fischer (University of California) Neuroscience and Criminal Responsibility: Exploring Causation Hank Greely (Stanford University Law School) Law, Neuroscience and Criminal Culpability  Lisa Claydon (University of West of England)
13:15	LUNCH
14:00	SESSION VIIA:
	Rationality, Responsibility and Brain Function Tom Buller (University of Alaska) Neuroscience and the Free Exercise of Religion Steven Goldberg (Georgetown Law Centre) The Neuroscience of Empathy and Compassion James Desmond Duffy
	SESSION VIIB:
	Competition in the Courtroom: Experiments on Adverserial Competition, Juror Sophistication and Decision Difficulty Cheryl Boudreau (University of California, Davis, Political Science) The Juridical Role of Emotions in the Decisional Process of Popular Juries Laura Capraro (University of Roma) Taking Companion Species Robin Mackenzie (University of Kent) The Efficiency of Penal Systems and the Perception Breaking The Law David Terracina (University of Roma)
15:45	BREAK
16:15	SESSION VIII:
	Neuroscience and Disorders of Communication Joseph Fins (Cornell University) Black Boxes Julie Seaman (Emory University Law School) Neuroscience in Court: Lessons from the History of Forensic Science  Jennifer Mnookin (UCLA Law School) Neuroscience of cruelty as brain damage: legal framings of capacity and ethical issues in the neuro-rehabilitation of motor neurone disease and behavioural variant fronto-temporal dementia patients Robin Mackenzie (Medical Law & Ethics Centre, University of Kent) and Dr Mohamed Sakel (Director, Neurorehabilitation Services and Director of Research and Development, East Kent University Hospital Trust)
18:00	DRINKS RECEPTION
19:00	CONFERENCE END

 

News Roundup from the Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics: Program in Ethics and Brain Sciences

July 2, 2009

Last Edition's Most Popular Article ·     How food makers captured our brains     NY Times June 22 2009 In the Academic Literature: Personal identity and fractured selves Johns Hopkins Univ Press (forthcoming)  Disrupting disordered neurocircuitry: treating refractory psychiatric illness with neuromodulation Mayo Clinic Proc June 2009; 84(6):522-32 Dynamic interactions between musical, cardiovascular and cerebral rhythms in humans Circulation 2009; 119:3171-80 The brain collector Science June 26 2009; 324 Dopamine dysregulation syndrome, impulse control disorders and punding after deep brain stimulation surgery for Parkinson’s disease J Clin Neurosc June 23 2009; Available online Deep brain stimulation for schizophrenia Stereotact Funct Neurosurg 2009; 87:266 Functional and anatomical connectivity abnormalities in left inferior frontal gyrus in schizophrenia Human Brain Mapping June 30 2009; published online Somatosensory working memory performance in humans depends on both engagement and disengagement of regions in a distributed network Human Brain Mapping June 30 2009; published online In the Popular Press ·        A biology of mental disorder  Newsweek June 27 2009 ·        Chasing genetic ghosts of mental illness PsychCentral Blog June 29 2009 ·         Disorderly genius: how chaos drives the brain  NewScientist June 29 2009 ·         Chimpanzees learn from video demo  BBC News July 1  2009 ·         Toyota technology has brain waves move wheelchair  Times-Tribune July 2 2009 ·         A helping hand for addicts  Nature News June 25 2009 ·         Reading the brains of pigeons in flight  NY Times June 25 2009 ·        Calculating consumer happiness at any price  NY Times June 29 2009 The Program in Ethics and Brain Sciences (PEBS) is a collaborative effort of the Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics and the Johns Hopkins Brain Sciences Institute. The goal of PEBS is to ensure that research in brain science proceeds with an informed understanding of ethical issues, and that philosophical and empirical analyses of the advances in brain research proceed with an informed understanding of the science. With the PEBS Neuroethics News Roundup, we will present a weekly survey of the most pertinent and thought-provoking new articles from both peer-reviewed academic journals and the popular press.  Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics | 201 North Charles, Suite 1701  Baltimore, MD 21201 | Office: 410-625-7871  Archived editions of PEBS Neuroethics News Round Up www.bioethicsinstitute.org/neuroethics

Upcoming Talks at Oxford

This Friday, July 3, I'll be giving two talks at Oxford.  As always, Neuroethics & Law Blog readers in attendance are encouraged to introduce themselves.

The first, "Neurotechnology and Subjective Experience," will be held at 2pm at the Oxford Centre for Functional MRI of the Brain. 

The second, "Why Retributivists Must Abolish Prison," will be held at the Old Indian Institute and is sponsored by the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics.  Here is some more information on the second talk:

Friday 3 July, 4.00 p.m. - 5.30 p.m.
Why Retributivists Must Abolish Prison
Adam Kolber, Professor of Law, University of San Diego

Strong retributivists hold that we are obligated to punish offenders in proportion to their blameworthiness.  There are two principal reasons, however, why this view is inconsistent with our prison sentencing policies.  First, our sentencing policies usually ignore variation in prisoners' subjective experiences of incarceration.  Two people may commit offenses that make them equally blameworthy.  Yet, even if they receive equal terms of incarceration, the prisoner with more difficulty adapting to prison is likely to be punished more severely than the prisoner who adapts more readily.  Second, our sentencing policies neglect to consider variation in offenders' baseline conditions.  An offender with greater liberty or subjective well-being outside of prison is likely to be punished more by a particular term in prison than an offender with a worse baseline condition, even when the offenders are equally blameworthy.  In both of these examples, offenders may be equally blameworthy yet receive unequal punishments. 

Our sentencing policies generally ignore (and often strive to ignore) variation in both offenders' baseline conditions and their punishment experiences, even though such variation must be considered in order to satisfy retributivist commitments to proportional punishment.  While we can imagine creating prison sentencing policies that actually do take into account pertinent variation among offenders, such policies are impractical and likely to have few proponents.  I will, therefore, argue that strong retributivists, and perhaps all retributivists, must cease support for incarceration.  (For background reading, see http://ssrn.com/abstract=1090337 and http://ssrn.com/abstract=1266158.)

Kiehl on Psychopathy

Kent Kiehl (Psychology, Univ. New Mexico) has posted the following abstract to SSRN (so far, only the abstract is posted):

"The Criminal Psychopath Revealed: Assessment, Recidivism, Treatment and Neuroscience" 

Gruter Institute Squaw Valley Conference 2009: Law, Behavior & the Brain

KENT KIEHL

Psychopathy and substance abuse are severe, co-morbid clinical disorders associated with significant civil and criminal disruption. Significant strides have been made in understanding how substance abuse and psychopathy predict institutional behavior, criminal recidivism, and treatment outcome. However, little is understood in terms of the neural systems associated with these disorders and how they interact - which limits treatment efforts designed to remediate risk factors associated with relapse to substance abuse and criminal behavior.

One complicating factor is that clinical research with incarcerated populations is hampered by the limited availability of noninvasive imaging systems. The Mind Mobile Imaging System was designed to help address this issue. In the first two years of deployment, the Mind Mobile Imaging system has been used to collect more than 1000 brain imaging sessions with incarcerated populations. This body of research has led to important discoveries of regarding the neural systems associated with psychopathy and substance abuse. These results significantly advance our understanding of psychopathy and substance abuse and may lead directly to novel cognitive behavioral treatment programs designed to remediate risk factors associated with these clinical conditions.

Brain Imaging and Disorders of Consciousness

Stacey Tovino has posted the following to SSRN:

"Neuroimaging Research into Disorders of Consciousness: Moral Imperative or Ethical and Legal Failure?" 

Virginia Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2008

STACEY A. TOVINO, Drake University Law School
In this article I explore the ethical and legal implications of enrolling individuals with disorders of consciousness (DOC) in neuroimaging research studies. Many scientists have strongly emphasized the need for additional neuroimaging research into DOC, characterizing the conduct of such studies as morally imperative. On the other hand, institutional review boards (IRBs) charged with approving research protocols, scientific journals deciding whether to publish study results, and federal agencies that disburse grant money have limited the conduct, publication, and funding of consciousness investigations based on ethical and legal concerns. Following a detailed examination of the risks and benefits of neuroimaging research involving individuals with DOC, I urge IRBs, scientific journals, and funding agencies to no longer stall the conduct, publication, and funding of neuroimaging research into DOC if certain criteria designed to protect the health and safety of individuals with DOC are satisfied.

EEG-Controlled Wheelchair

Toyota has developed a wheelchair controlled by EEG.  The story here makes the prototype sound very impressive.

Moriarty on Brain Imaging and Deception

Jane Campbell Moriarty (Law, University of Akron) has posted Visions of Deception: Neuroimages and the Search for Truth (Akron Law Review, Vol. 42, p. 739, 2009) to SSRN. Here is the abstract:

The historical use of science in the search for truth has posed consistent evidentiary problems of definition, causation, validity, accuracy, inferential conclusions unsupported by data, and complications of real-world applications. As the Innocence Project exoneration data show and the National Academy of Science Report on Forensic Science suggest, our reach in this area may well exceed our grasp. This article argues that the neuroimaging of deception - focusing primarily on the functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies done to date - may well include all of these problems. This symposium article reviews briefly the types of neuroimaging used to detect deception, describes some of the specific criticisms leveled at the science, and explains why these small group of studies are not yet courtroom-ready. Arguing that the studies meet neither the general acceptance nor reliability standards of evidence, the article urges courts to act with restraint, allowing time for further studies, further robust criticism of the studies, additional replication studies, and sufficient time for moral, ethical, and jurisprudential rumination about whether the legal system really wants this type of evidence.

(Hat tip: Larry Solum's Legal Theory Blog)

Bioethics on Neuroethics

The current issue of Bioethics has a neuroethics theme.  (Thanks to Marc Schneijder for the reminder).  Here are the contents of the current issue:

Volume 23 Issue 6 (July 2009)

EDITORIAL

DRILLING DOWN IN NEUROETHICS (p iii-iv)
FRANÇOISE BAYLIS, JOCELYN DOWNIE
Published Online: Jun 7 2009 11:41PM
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2009.01730.x

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ARTICLES

OUR BRAINS ARE NOT US (p 321-329)
WALTER GLANNON
Published Online: Jun 7 2009 11:41PM
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2009.01727.x

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INTENTION, AUTONOMY, AND BRAIN EVENTS (p 330-339)
GRANT GILLETT
Published Online: Jun 7 2009 11:41PM
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2009.01726.x

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EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON NEUROIMAGING – A CRUCIAL PREREQUISITE FOR NEUROETHICS (p 340-348)
CHRISTIAN G. HUBER, JOHANNES HUBER
Published Online: Jun 7 2009 11:41PM
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2009.01728.x

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NEUROIMAGING IN PSYCHIATRY: EVALUATING THE ETHICAL CONSEQUENCES FOR PATIENT CARE (p 349-359)
ALISON C. BOYCE
Published Online: Jun 7 2009 11:41PM
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2009.01724.x

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AUTONOMY AND AUTHENTICITY OF ENHANCED PERSONALITY TRAITS (p 360-374)
JAN CHRISTOPH BUBLITZ, REINHARD MERKEL
Published Online: Jun 7 2009 11:41PM
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2009.01725.x

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PERSONAL IDENTITY, ENHANCEMENT AND NEUROSURGERY: A QUALITATIVE STUDY IN APPLIED NEUROETHICS (p 375-383)
NIR LIPSMAN, REBECCA ZENER, MARK BERNSTEIN
Published Online: Jun 7 2009 11:41PM
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2009.01729.x

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Maroney on the Adolescent Brain and Juvenile Justice

Terry Maroney has posted the following to SSRN:

"The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice" 

Gruter Institute Squaw Valley Conference 2009: Law, Behavior & the Brain

TERRY A. MARONEY, Vanderbilt University - School of Law
ABSTRACT: Developmental neuroscience is fast generating new findings about the teen brain. Many advocates, defenders, and commentators believe that such findings strongly influenced elimination of the juvenile death penalty and now seek to expand their reach. This Article is the first to take a systematic look at how, since Roper v. Simmons, arguments based in developmental neuroscience are faring in practice. It demonstrates that brain science has had little meaningful impact on juvenile justice in the courts. Close analysis of the cases reveals many doctrinal hurdles, posed primarily by relatively thin prevailing conceptions of sentence proportionality and mens rea, and some opportunities, particularly in the realm of individualized sentencing. More, whether a decision-maker is disposed to credit the insights of adolescent brain science appears to be driven by precommitments. Close analysis of the science?as well as the manner in which it is being presented?reveals further obstacles, both practical and theoretical, as well as some opportunities for that science to inform assessment of group tendencies. This Article concludes that high hopes for adolescent brain science have been, and are likely to remain, largely unrealized. Although there is a theoretically defensible role for that science going forward, that role is a limited one. Advances in developmental neuroscience do not alter and, indeed, tend to reinforce a social commitment to treat youth differently. Courts, theorists, and advocates?but most importantly legislatures?therefore should take note of it as one reason among many to recommit to a balanced system of juvenile justice. To put greater weight on the science is, at this moment, unnecessary and unwise.

The Voodoo They No Longer Call Voodoo

An important and controversial neuroscience paper, formerly titled "Voodoo Correlations in Social Neuroscience," has been posted here under its new name "Puzzlingly High Correlations in fMRI Studies of Emotion, Personality, and Social Cognition."  You can find discussion of the paper and the reason the name was changed here in an article from the Chronicle of Higher Education.  A sample from the Chronicle article:

One of the most-debated psychology papers of the last few years is finally about to enjoy its official print publication — but without the provocative title that helped spark the debate in the first place.

. . .

The paper argues that many recent studies in social neuroscience — and, by implication, in several other types of neuroscience — suffer from a severe statistical flaw.

At issue are the brain-imaging studies that appear in the newspaper almost every day: studies that attempt to find correlations between, say, jealousy or gambling and specific regions of the brain. To oversimplify, the “Voodoo” paper argues that most such studies report spuriously high correlations because neuroscientists don’t adequately guard against the possibility that the brain patterns they see are simply random.

News Roundup from the Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics: Program in Ethics and Brain Sciences

From PEBS:

June 11, 2009

Last Edition's Most Popular Article ·         Electrodes spark neuron growth Nature online May 29 2009 In the Academic Literature: Deep Brain Stimulation, Neuroethics, and the Minimally Conscious State: Moving Beyond Proof of Principle Archives of Neurology 2009:66(6):697-702 Cognitive Functions in a Patient With Parkinson-Dementia Syndrome Undergoing Deep Brain Stimulation Archives of Neurology 2009:66(6):781-785 Neurocognitive processes of the religious leader in Christians Human Brain Mapping June 8 2009 Deep Brain Stimulation for Pediatric Movement Disorders Seminars in Pediatric Neurology 2009:16(2):90-98 Two types of dopamine neuron distinctly convey positive and negative motivational signals Nature 2009:459:837-841 Neural correlates of depth of strategic reasoning in medial prefrontal cortex PNAS 2009:106(23):9163-9168 Are Disorders Sufficient for Reduced Responsibility? Neuroethics Advance Online Publication In the Popular Press: Donor organ ‘personality’ worry BBC News June 5 2009   Why your brain just can’t remember that word New Scientist June 8 2009 Neuroscience Goes to War Science Progress June 5 2009 Speeding up brain networks might boost IQ New Scientist June 9 2009 Predictive Powers: A Robot That Reads Your intention? Science Daily June 10 2009   The Program in Ethics and Brain Sciences (PEBS) is a collaborative effort of the Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics and the Johns Hopkins Brain Sciences Institute. The goal of PEBS is to ensure that research in brain science proceeds with an informed understanding of ethical issues, and that philosophical and empirical analyses of the advances in brain research proceeds with an informed understanding of the science. With the PEBS Neuroethics News Roundup, we will present a weekly survey of the most pertinent and thought-provoking new articles from both peer-reviewed academic journals and the popular press.  Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics | 201 North Charles, Suite 1701  Baltimore, MD 21201 | Office: 410-625-7871  Archived editions of PEBS Neuroethics News Round Up www.bioethicsinstitute.org/neuroethics

 

 

Angels, demons and complaining creationists (Ryan)

I just saw Dan Brown’s Angels and Demons on the big screen. Its OK, if you like that sort of thing, but I shouldn’t rush. It mainly action adventure of course, but it is also about a clash of Science and Religion.

That theme has special relevance for me right at the moment, for I have recently been involved in a Science/Religious clash of my own.

I’m a psychiatrist with the University of Sydney and this year I was to give a new lecture called “Introduction to Mental Illness” to second year medical students. The brief was to try to get med students interested in and excited about psychiatry.

I decided it might be fun to provide an introduction to philosophy of mind, providing a sort of basic introduction to the science that might underlie our assumptions about our mental life.

The lecture was nothing special and simply ranged over a number of different approaches to the mind including dualism (which I gave reasonably short shrift), identity theory, functionalism and eliminative materialism. In introducing the final “ism” I followed a fairly well worn path of pointing out that adherents to eliminative materialism call our general understanding of human mental life, folk psychology and that they then question the likelihood of this folk theory surviving in the face of advancing science.

As many will know, eliminative materialists support their case by giving other examples of folk theories that have eventually been proved to be bankrupt, and I also took this tack. It is a fifty minute lecture, but it only took one utterance to provoke one of the students to launch a three page complaint to the sub-dean:

“In the past, say Eliminative Materialists, numerous folk theories have bitten the dust, under the advance of science: the celestial sphere theory of astronomy, the phlogiston theory of combustion, the demon theory of disease, the creationist theory of speciation. All were once seen as the truth; all our now historical relics.”

It was that last example that was the offending one. My complainant did not appear to favour the demon theory of disease – which is reassuring in a trainee doctor, but she was outraged at my suggestion that the creation theory of speciation was dead. It may be relevant that the complainant was from North America.

The sub-dean took the complaint seriously (as he should) but there was (of course) no suggestion I should alter my lecture in the future.

Creationists have not had near the influence in Australia that they apparently have in the US. I had briefly thought this throw away line might provoke some response, but I did not anticipate the vituperative attack that it inspired.

I would love to hear, especially from US colleagues, who may have similar experiences.