Posted by Adam Kolber on 05/24/2013 at 02:36 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)
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Posted by NELB Staff on 05/24/2013 at 11:43 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)
Australian University Students’ Attitudes Towards the Acceptability and Regulation of Pharmaceuticals to Improve Academic Performance by Stephanie Bell, Brad Partridge, Jayne Lucke and Wayne Hall has been published in the most recent issue of Neuroethics:
Abstract
There is currently little empirical information about attitudes towards cognitive enhancement - the use of pharmaceutical drugs to enhance normal brain functioning. It is claimed this behaviour most commonly occurs in students to aid studying. We undertook a qualitative assessment of attitudes towards cognitive enhancement by conducting 19 semi-structured interviews with Australian university students. Most students considered cognitive enhancement to be unacceptable, in part because they believed it to be unethical but there was a lack of consensus on whether it was similar or different to steroid use in sport. There was support for awareness campaigns and monitoring of cognitive enhancement use of pharmaceutical drugs. An understanding of student attitudes towards cognitive enhancement is important in formulating future policy.
Posted by NELB Staff on 05/24/2013 at 09:55 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)
Recently posted to SSRN (and published at 21 Journal of Law and Policy 37 (2012)):
"Neuroscience and the Child Welfare System"
Clare Huntington, Fordham Law School
A growing body of research by neuroscientists demonstrates that a child’s early life experiences and environment literally shape the child’s brain architecture, with lifelong consequences that are very difficult to reverse. Children’s relationships with their primary caregivers are at the core of this brain development, but when this relationship is severely deficient, the developing child’s brain is deeply affected. This research has not gained sufficient recognition in policy debates about the child welfare system because much of the work is complex and hard for non-neuroscientists to decipher with nuance. This essay brings a family law scholar’s perspective to understanding the possibilities and limitations of drawing on this still-emerging science in the development of child welfare policy.
Posted by NELB Staff on 05/24/2013 at 09:28 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)
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Posted by NELB Staff on 05/22/2013 at 09:28 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)
Abstract
Rapid advances in neuroscience may enable us to identify the neural correlates of ordinary decision making. Such knowledge opens up the possibility of acquiring highly accurate information about people’s competence to consent to medical procedures and to participate in medical research. Currently we are unable to determine competence to consent with accuracy and we make a number of unrealistic practical assumptions to deal with our ignorance. Here I argue that if we are able to detect competence to consent and if we are able to develop a reliable neural test of competence to consent, then these assumptions will have to be rejected. I also consider and reject three lines of argument that might be developed by a defender of the status quo in order to protect our current practices regarding judgments of competence in the face of the availability of information about the neural correlates of ordinary human decision making.
Posted by NELB Staff on 05/22/2013 at 09:52 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)
Cognitive Enhancement, Rational Choice and Justification by Veljko Dubljević has been published in the most recent issue of Nueroethics:
Abstract
This paper examines the claims in the debate on cognitive enhancement in neuroethics that society wide pressure to enhance can be expected in the near future. The author uses rational choice modeling to test these claims and proceeds with the analysis of proposed types of solutions. The discourage use, laissez-faire and prohibition types of policy are scrutinized for effectiveness, legitimacy and associated costs. Special attention is given to the moderately liberal discourage use policy (and the gate-keeper and taxation approaches within this framework), as many authors presuppose that this type of policy would best serve public interest. Different more or less articulated models in the taxation approach (Tobacco regulation analogy, Coffee-shop system, Regulatory Authority for Cognitive Enhancements and Economic Disincentives Model) are analyzed from the point of view of justificatory liberalism. The author concludes that prohibition and laissez-faire types of policy would neither be effective nor justified. A moderately liberal public policy shows more promise, but not all approaches within this type of policy would be legitimate and effective. The “gate-keeper” approach and related models could not be justified whereas approach based on taxation with suitable models might be legitimate and effective.
Posted by NELB Staff on 05/20/2013 at 09:50 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)
Treating Yourself as an Object: Self-Objectification and the Ethical Dimensions of Antidepressant Use by Ginger A. Hoffman has been published in the most recent issue of Neuroethics:
Abstract
In this paper, I offer one moral reason to eschew antidepressant medication in favor of cognitive therapy, all other things being equal: taking antidepressants can be a form of self-objectification. This means that, by taking antidepressants, one treats oneself, in some sense and some cases, like a mere object. I contend that, morally, this amounts to a specific form of devaluing oneself. I argue this as follows. First, I offer a detailed definition of “objectification” and argue for the possibility of self-objectification on this definition. I then explain why this form of self-objectification is morally problematic. (Morally problematic does not mean morally impermissible. It means, instead, that there is a moral reason opposing the activity in question). After, I describe how taking antidepressants can count as self-objectifying. Finally, I defend my thesis against a key objection offered by Levy. Thus, assuming that antidepressants and cognitive therapy are equally efficacious, and that all other things are equal, the self-objectifying character of antidepressants is a compelling reason to regard cognitive therapy as a first-choice treatment for depression.
Posted by NELB Staff on 05/17/2013 at 09:48 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)
Ideals of Student Excellence and Enhancement by Gavin G. Enck has been published in the most recent issue of Nueroethics:
Abstract
Discussions about the permissibility of students using enhancements in education are often framed by the question, “Is a student who uses cognitive-enhancing drugs cheating?” While the question of cheating is interesting, it is but only one question concerning the permissibility of enhancement in education. Another interesting question is, “What kinds of students do we want in our academic institutions?” I suggest that one plausible answer to this question concerns the ideals of human excellence or virtues. The students we want in our academic institutions are virtuous or, at least minimally, possess certain virtues. I argue that a virtuous student may choose to use cognitive-enhancing drugs for reasons of self-improvement. That a virtuous student may choose to use cognitive-enhancing drugs for reasons of self-improvement illustrates that under certain conditions motivation can determine the permissibility of using enhancements. Building upon this I suggest a virtues-based institutional rule for governing and guiding student-use of cognitive enhancers in an academic institution to be for the right reasons. This ideals of human excellence or virtues approach offers interesting and unique insights for issues of enhancement in education, as it might turn out, that uneasiness many people have about students using cognitive-enhancing drugs has less to do with issues of enhancement and more to do with the motivations and character of students.
Posted by NELB Staff on 05/15/2013 at 09:42 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)
‘The Thorny and Arduous Path of Moral Progress’: Moral Psychology and Moral Enhancement by Chris Zarpentine has been published in the most recent issue of Neuroethics:
Abstract
The moral enhancement of humans by biological or genetic means has recently been urged as a response to the pressing concerns facing human civilization. In this paper, I argue that proponents of biological moral enhancement have misrepresented the facts of human moral psychology. As a result, the likely effectiveness of traditional methods of moral enhancement has been underestimated, relative to biological or genetic means. I review arguments in favor of biological moral enhancement and argue that the complexity of moral psychology raises serious problems for such interventions. I offer a programmatic sketch of the ways in which our improved understanding of moral psychology can help facilitate more traditional methods of moral enhancement. I conclude that the best response to the dangers faced by human civilization is the continued use of traditional methods of moral enhancement and the use of our improved understanding of moral psychology to further refine and develop these methods.
Posted by NELB Staff on 05/14/2013 at 08:00 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)
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Posted by NELB Staff on 05/09/2013 at 06:58 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)
A new study has found a relationship between cortisol levels in our hair and prevalence of metabolic syndrome (a cluster of abnormalities that increase the likelihood of developing diabetes and heart disease). Here’s how the New York Times describes the study:
High levels of cortisol — the so-called stress hormone — have been associated with cardiovascular disease in some studies, but not in others. This may be because measuring cortisol in blood or saliva at one point in time may pick up acute stress, but it fails to account for long-term stress. . . . Now Dutch researchers have assessed cortisol levels over several months by analyzing scalp hair samples. . . . The researchers measured the cortisol content in hair samples corresponding to roughly three months of growth from 283 older men and women, average age 75. They also gathered self-reported data about coronary heart disease, stroke, peripheral artery disease, Type 2 diabetes, lung disease, cancer and osteoporosis. . . . Compared with those in the lowest quarter for cortisol, those in the highest quarter had about three times the risk for cardiovascular disease and diabetes.
In the actual paper, the researchers say little or nothing about “stress,” and if I recall correctly, the relationship between cortisol and stress can be complicated. But the research raises the possibility that we will someday identify reliable measurements of chronic stress over time. Of course, we may need more than just your hair. But in what I call the experiential future, such evidence—combined perhaps with other physiological, neurological, and psychiatric data—may enable us to make better assessments of chronic stress levels than we can now.
Better measurements of chronic stress could transform the way we measure damages in tort cases and measure punishment severity in criminal cases. Billions of dollars change hands every year based on difficult-to-verify assertions about pain and stress. Similarly, we adjust the severity of incarceration by changing the duration of sentences and pay almost no attention to the very different ways in which prisoners experience confinement. Measurements of stress levels could also help determine when an interrogation tactic constitutes torture.
Of course, forensic techniques encourage people to use countermeasures. In the cortisol-hair study, for example, one measurement was apparently affected by rates of shampooing while another was not. So I’m not suggesting there will be a silver bullet that solves all measurement problems. When evaluating the scientific research, however, it is important to remember just how bad we are at measuring stress levels now, despite the fact that we make such assessments every day. The technology need hardly be perfect to represent an improvement.
[Originally posted at Harvard Law School's Petrie-Flom Blog]
Posted by Adam Kolber on 05/09/2013 at 03:01 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)
On the Criminal Culpability of Successful and Unsuccessful Psychopaths by Katrina L. Sifferd and William Hirstein has been published in the most recent issue of Neuroethics:
Abstract
The psychological literature now differentiates between two types of psychopath: successful (with little or no criminal record) and unsuccessful (with a criminal record). Recent research indicates that earlier findings of reduced autonomic activity, reduced prefrontal grey matter, and compromised executive activity may only be true of unsuccessful psychopaths. In contrast, successful psychopaths actually show autonomic and executive function that exceeds that of normals, while having no difference in prefrontal volume from normals. We argue that many successful psychopaths are legally responsible for their actions, as they have the executive capacity to choose not to harm (and thus are legally rational). However, many unsuccessful psychopaths have a lack of executive function that should at least partially excuse them from criminal culpability. Although a successful psychopath's increased executive function may occur in conflict with, rather than in consonance with their increased autonomic activity—producing a cognitive style characterized by selfdeception and articulate-sounding, but unsound reasoning—they may be capable of recognizing and correcting their lack of autonomic data, and thus can be held responsible.
Posted by NELB Staff on 05/08/2013 at 08:00 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)
Involuntary & Voluntary Invasive Brain Surgery: Ethical Issues Related to Acquired Aggressiveness by Frederic Gilbert, Andrej Vranic and Samia Hurst has been published in the most recent issue of Neuroethics:
Abstract
Clinical cases of frontal lobe lesions have been significantly associated with acquired aggressive behaviour. Restoring neuronal and cognitive faculties of aggressive individuals through invasive brain intervention raises ethical questions in general. However, more questions have to be addressed in cases where individuals refuse surgical treatment. The ethical desirability and permissibility of using intrusive surgical brain interventions for involuntary or voluntary treatment of acquired aggressiveness is highly questionable. This article engages with the description of acquired aggressiveness in general, and presents a rare clinical case to illustrate the difficulties of treating this population. To expand the debate further, this article explores the ethics related to invasive brain surgery in three parts: a) it examines coercive involuntary invasive brain surgery for the benefit of protecting others on individuals suffering from acquired aggressiveness who lack decision-making capacities to consent; b) it addresses voluntary psychosurgery on individuals suffering from acquired aggressiveness who are competent to consent; and, c) it questions whether acquired aggressive individuals, who are legally competent, have a duty to consent to invasive brain surgery, in order to maintain their autonomy by reducing or even eliminate their aggressive drives. Ensuring the safety and efficacy of surgical brain interventions could increase the ethical permissibility of voluntary treatment, but it would not necessarily entail ethical justification for proceeding with invasive brain surgery for treatment of intractable acquired aggressive behaviour.
Posted by NELB Staff on 05/06/2013 at 08:00 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)
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Posted by NELB Staff on 05/03/2013 at 04:53 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)
